


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
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**ANNUAL REPORT OF THE  
RESERVE FORCES  
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FISCAL YEAR 1985**



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"My Administration is determined that these vital Reserve Forces will be manned, equipped, and trained to meet their full responsibility as a combat-ready element of the Total Force. Only through this Total Force can our nation remain strong enough that no potential adversary will dare attack our nation or endanger our vital interest.

RONALD REAGAN  
President of the United States  
July 6, 1981

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"In our country, Reserve service has a proud tradition, one that remains extremely vital to our defense today. . . . The Guard and Reserve missions are more immediate than at any time in our history. . . .

"As statutory principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve Components, you retain policy independence to examine any subject affecting the Reserve Components and to provide me your unvarnished recommendations. You are the only forum in (the Office of the Secretary of Defense) which offers me the unfiltered views of the non-active duty Reserve Component leadership. I value that advice."

HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
Secretary of Defense  
(Remarks before the Reserve Forces Policy Board)  
March 12, 1985

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

14 FEB 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board  
For Fiscal Year 1985

This forwards the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 133(c)(3).

The Board by statute provides me policy advice on matters relating to the Reserve Components. This report is in an expanded format that includes information formerly provided in the Board's Readiness Assessment Report. The report reflects those issues addressed by the Board, and presents a balanced view by recognizing both the problems that must still be overcome and the progress that has been made.

I am confident the Board will actively continue to assist our efforts to make further progress in the readiness of the Reserve Components.

*Jasper W. Kittinger*

Attachment

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# **RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD**

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## **FISCAL YEAR 1985 ANNUAL REPORT**

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This report represents the views of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington, D.C. 20301

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## Executive Summary

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The Reserve Forces Policy Board is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" and is required to provide an Annual Report to the President and to the Congress. The report this year incorporates material which previously has been presented in the Board's "Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components." Although this Annual Report does address readiness as a separate chapter, the issues of readiness cannot be entirely separated from chapters on personnel, training, equipment, facilities and the budget.

Readiness is an indicator of precombat status which **projects** the ability of a unit to carry out the general mission for which it is designed. It is not to be confused with military capability which is "the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective. . . ." The Board was pleased to note that in FY 1985 the capability of Reserve Component forces increased because of the accession of additional modernized equipment, increased personnel strength, and better retention of trained personnel.

However, and as reported in previous years, the readiness reporting system within DoD does not portray adequately the true capability of the Total Force. Unit readiness ratings may be lower than desired because of the recent introduction of modern equipment and the ensuing problem of insufficient training on the new equipment at the time of the rating evaluation.

Of the seven Reserve Components, the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve reported that the number of units rated "Marginally Combat Ready" (C-3 status) or better increased since the last fiscal year. Ratings of Naval Reserve Commissioned units also showed "Combat Ready" increases, but Naval Reserve Reinforcing/Sustaining units showed overall decreases. The Army Reserve also reported that the number of units rated C-3 or better declined over the fiscal year. Percentage variances in ratings from FY 1984 data ranged from plus 12 percent in the Air National Guard to minus two percent in the Army Reserve.

The major factors limiting enhanced unit readiness are "equipment on-hand," "equipment readiness," "individual skill qualification," and "training." The rating decreases found in the Army Reserve and Naval Reserve are directly attributable to force structure changes, the addition of modernized equipment to the inventory, and the resulting training required in the new units and on the new equipment.

In recent years, equipment requirements have increased as more missions have been assigned to the

Reserve Components. The provision of new or redistributed equipment has resulted in a reduction of equipment shortfalls in the past year. Critical shortages for the Reserve Components still remain in communications and electronic equipment and in modern aircraft. However, within each Service there are other significant shortages which impact on a unit's ability to manage, train, and mobilize and to be effectively employed and compatible with other forces. These include wheeled vehicles, chemical defense equipment, management information systems, training equipment and devices/simulators, medical equipment, maintenance sets, engineer equipment, cold weather gear, and many other similar items which do not individually have high dollar values. Cumulatively, the dollar shortage is approximately \$15 billion for Reserve Component equipment. Yet even this figure does not fully reflect the total costs for replacing or modernizing obsolete, aging, substitute or nondeployable items currently in the inventory.

In FY 1985, Congress added to the DoD budget request \$380 million in separate appropriations for Guard and Reserve equipment. These appropriations, for specified or unspecified equipment, enhance the modernization of the Reserve Components. Moreover, the opportunities for the Services to build a "support" base along with the purchase of major end items are enhanced since often the smaller dollar value items may not be requested by DoD or authorized or funded by Congress.

As a direct result of one of Congressman Montgomery's initiatives this year, Congress approved legislation which mandates the collection and dissemination of additional useful information in the "Annual Report on Guard and Reserve Equipment." For several years, the Board recommended that nondeployable and substitute equipment be accurately identified to analyze better the extent of equipment problems. The new report now requires a list of substitute items. It also excludes items which are nondeployable from being counted as on-hand assets against a wartime requirement. These factors will make the report a better tool for developing and managing equipment acquisition and distribution strategies.

As mentioned, individual skill qualification and training are also inhibitors to unit readiness. Constraints of time, space, and equipment availability for Guard and Reserve personnel and their units influence these inhibitors. In some cases, increased availability of training devices/simulators can resolve skill building and skill retention problems and can reduce training time and space requirements. In other instances, greater participation in

Joint Chiefs of Staff or Service exercises, within CONUS or at overseas locations, will enhance the development and maintenance of individual and unit capabilities. The Services are also providing increased training opportunities at regional training facilities specifically oriented to Reserve Component forces, and they are opening up Active Component sites for expanded use by Guard and Reserve members.

Many of the facilities used by Reserve Component members are inadequate for the increasing numbers of users and for full employment of modern weapon systems. New major construction as well as minor construction and facility repairs are necessary and must be prioritized based on the contribution of the facility to the readiness of the units being supported. Use of training areas and air spaces has been restricted as a result of encroachment by civilian communities and aviation, and related environmental issues have reduced training space or time. The Board considers these developments to be worthy of closer attention because the adequacy of space and the quality and maintenance of facilities affect training, individual and unit morale, the recruitment and retention of personnel, and ultimately the overall readiness of a unit and the force as a whole.

Expanding missions, equipment modernization, force structure changes, the shrinking pool of recruitable personnel, and added training requirements have increased pressure on the attainment of personnel goals in the Reserve Components. In spite of these factors, DoD was able to attain 101 percent of programmed end strength for the Reserve Components in FY 1985. At the same time, the quality of recruits has increased although there are emerging signs that it may be becoming more difficult to continue to recruit the desired number of high quality individuals. Notwithstanding these developing conditions, required strength levels continue to increase. As a result, innovative efforts are underway in the Services to enhance recruiting and retention of trained personnel to meet new goals. Significant dollar savings and training time can be realized through the retention of qualified Reserve Component members.

Family and employer conflicts continue as the most significant factors causing personnel to terminate their service in the Reserve Components. Special studies are being conducted to determine reasons for family conflicts so that programs can be developed to aid service member retention. The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve continues its excellent programs at the "grassroots" level but needs additional resources as it attempts to solve issues resulting from increased requirements placed upon Reserve Component members.


Retention and recruiting successes affect the strength of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The size of the IRR must be increased to meet requirements for fillers and replacements upon mobilization to avoid breaking apart Selected Reserve units. In addition to strength levels, the maintenance of military skills of IRR members is of concern to the Board. The use of a voluntary muster to determine availability and fitness of IRR soldiers was initially tested by the Army Reserve in September 1985. Future tests and musters in 1986 and 1987 are also planned. The Board is pleased with the continuing progress in the growth of the IRR since its low point in 1978. This increase coupled with the strength increase in the Selected Reserve provides growth in overall defense strength although the levels of active duty personnel have remained nearly static.

Full-time support (which includes active duty personnel, Active Guard/Reserve personnel, military technicians, and civil service personnel) provides essential assistance to units striving for higher levels of readiness. Past and programmed increases in full-time support demonstrate the commitment of the Services to improve the readiness and capabilities of the Reserve Component forces. Each Service has structured its full-time support program to best suit its own unique needs. Full-time support strength varies from 29 percent in the Air National Guard to 10 percent in the Army Reserve Components. This vital and successful program must continue to be emphasized and funded.

The Board regularly monitors policies pertaining to the appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the Reserve Components. It has participated in the DoD process of producing the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act and urges that the proposed legislation be expedited through Congress.

Congress has demonstrated strong support for the Reserve Components through appropriations for procurement, personnel strength increases, bonuses and benefits, training funds, and military construction. These appropriations have assisted in the improvement of the readiness and capability of Reserve Component forces. However, the Board is concerned that Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations for the Reserve Components have not kept pace with the increased force structure, manning, and missions which have been recently given to the Guard and Reserve. In these circumstances, DoD and Congress must not allow across-the-board cuts in Reserve Component dollars which would restrict or negate progress in readiness made to date.

Summaries and recommendations pertaining to issues addressed by the Board during the year are at the conclusion of Chapters II through VII.



## Chapter I

# INTRODUCTION

### GENERAL

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175). This Annual Report of the Board is required by 10 USC 133(c)(3) and presents an independent evaluation of Reserve programs.

### A CONSOLIDATED REPORT

The Reserve Forces Policy Board prepared a report entitled "Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components" for each of the last eight years in addition to the Annual Report. Both documents reviewed the readiness of the Reserve Components, while the Annual Report as a statutory requirement also reviewed the appointment, promotion, retention and retirement of officer personnel. The Annual Report also reported on Board activities during the Fiscal Year. Both reports included recommendations for changes to policies, procedures, or laws which affect the Reserve Components.

The Board wishes, however, to provide information, independent review, and recommendations concerning the readiness of the Reserve Components in a more focused and timely manner. Therefore, the Board will now provide one consolidated document, its Annual Report, in an expanded format. Other

reports may be prepared on specific issues when appropriate.

### ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report is in six parts—Readiness, Personnel, Training, Equipment, Facilities and Budget issues. The chapter on Readiness addresses the subject generally, but readiness elements are necessarily included in other portions of the report. Appendices that follow provide additional information and data supporting the body of the text. The first appendix (Appendix A) is a glossary that defines many of the terms and acronyms used in the report. The issues and recommendations found in this report are derived from meetings, committee sessions, field trip observations, and reports available to the Board.

### COMMENTS INVITED

The Board appreciates the many helpful comments and recommendations that followed each of its previously published reports. We again invite comments on this report, which should be addressed to:

Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 3B256, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-7300

“

"Put the National Militia in such a condition as that they may appear truly respectable in the Eyes of our Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies."

*George Washington*

”



## Chapter II

# READINESS

### GENERAL

#### Background

Department of Defense Directive S-5100.44, "Master Plan for the National Military Command System," dated June 9, 1964, directs that the current combat readiness status of U.S. Armed Forces be periodically assessed and maintained to provide required information to the National Command Authority (NCA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In 1968, the Forces Status and Identity Report (FORSTAT) system was established to provide this information.

In January 1979, JCS initiated changes to the FORSTAT system which resulted in the Services adopting the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) in April 1980. The basic modifications were:

- Changing the name of the system from FORSTAT to UNITREP since the system reports unit, not force, status.
- Requiring units to compute C-ratings for four resource areas measured against wartime requirements as opposed to peacetime authorizations.
- Standardizing the quantitative criteria or percentages for determining the C-rating in the four resource areas.
- Establishing a fifth C-rating category to reflect a not combat ready condition due to Service-programmed action or change.

Confusion continued, with **readiness** and related terms still used in varying contexts with differing interpretations or definitions. The Department of Defense took a major step in 1982 to reduce confusion by standardizing the definition of **military capability** as "The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, or destroy a target set)." The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*/JCS Pub 1 definitions of the four supporting components or pillars of **military capability** are:

- **Force structure:** Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense

forces—divisions, ships, air wings.

- **Modernization:** Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapons systems, and equipment.
- **Readiness:** Ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays).
- **Sustainability:** The "staying power" of our forces, units, weapons systems, and equipment, often measured in number of days.

As it has been defined, then, readiness is an indicator of precombat status which projects the ability of a unit to achieve a wartime objective. Further, unit readiness is a subset of force readiness that involves unit integration and coordination through command, control, and communication to form a cohesive, effective element of the force.

#### System Limitations

The General Accounting Office and the Department of Defense are studying problems in readiness reporting systems, and have already identified a number of deficiencies. Problems in the UNITREP system include (1) nonuniform interpretations of reporting criteria by the Services, (2) inability of the system to adequately reflect capability, and (3) inaccuracies in the system. Several other factors reduce the scope and thus the comprehensiveness of the readiness status information generated through UNITREP. Users of such data need to be aware of these limitations.

First, UNITREP reports only on readiness, as measured by resources available versus wartime requirements, just one of the four "pillars." The system does not address combat sustainability, force modernization, or force structure.

Second, only combat, combat support, and selected combat service support units report readiness information under UNITREP.

Third, UNITREP reports only on certain selected resources controlled by or organic to the reporting unit. Important resources required to deploy,

employ, and sustain that unit in combat are not covered in C-ratings.

Fourth, the UNITREP system generally does not attempt to rate units against the requirements of specific operational plans, scenarios, or within mission areas.

### C-Rating Categories

Four resource areas are reported under UNITREP as defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Report Structure JCS Pub 6, Volume 1*. These four resource areas are (1) equipment and supplies on hand, (2) equipment readiness, (3) personnel, and (4) training. Units report in terms of combat readiness ratings (C-ratings), which attempt to measure a unit's ability to perform wartime tasks by assessing the peacetime availability and status of resources possessed or controlled by the unit or its parent unit. An overall C-rating is reported based on a composite of a unit's C-ratings in the four resource areas. There are five C-rating categories:

- **C-1, Fully Combat Ready.** A unit possesses its prescribed levels of wartime resources (equipment and personnel) and is trained so that it is capable of performing the wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, and tasked.
- **C-2, Substantially Combat Ready.** A unit has only minor deficiencies in its wartime level of resources or training.
- **C-3, Marginally Combat Ready.** A unit has major deficiencies in wartime resources or training which limit performance capability.
- **C-4, Not Combat Ready.** A unit has major deficiencies in wartime resources or training and thus cannot effectively perform its wartime mission.
- **C-5, Service-Programmed, Not Combat Ready.** Due to Service program(s), a unit does not possess the prescribed wartime resources or cannot perform the wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked. (For example, ships in overhaul and units undergoing major equipment conversion/transition).

### Reporting Overall C-Ratings

Normally, the overall rating should be equal to the lowest rating computed for the four resource areas. However, JCS guidance permits a unit's overall rating to be raised or lowered based on the commander's judgment and evaluation of his unit's status. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps allow commanders to use this prerogative; the Navy limits the overall rating to the lowest of the four areas. While adjustments to the overall rating are permitted, the computed ratings for the measured resource areas cannot be changed or modified.

### CAUTION NEEDED WHEN INTERPRETING READINESS DATA

In a broad sense, the UNITREP system satisfies a basic purpose for which it was established—it pro-

vides a single mechanism for each Service to report unit identity and status information to the NCA. However, it is important for users to recognize that JCS guidance to the Services (and Service implementation thereof) allows considerable discretion and subjectivity in the application of JCS criteria and the computation of the C-ratings. As a result, the UNITREP C-ratings are computed, submitted, and updated differently. This makes it difficult to compare like units, especially from Service to Service.

When reviewing the data contained in this section, therefore, it must be remembered that the information is the product of five different Service requirements, and is based on the examination of varying readiness elements from differing points of view. It must also be remembered that each Service has different readiness reporting criteria.

Please note additionally that the Navy reports readiness in "R" rather than "C" ratings for Reinforcing/Sustaining units. The Coast Guard also uses "R" rating to be consistent with the Navy. "R" and "C" are considered synonymous terminology for the purposes of this report.

### ANALYSIS OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT STATUS REPORTS

Some units have experienced temporary declines in readiness resulting from the introduction of more modern weapons systems and equipment. These new materiel authorizations and ensuing deliveries create a temporary situation of "unreadiness" because units report readiness against the new authorizations prior to receipt of equipment, unit personnel are not yet fully trained on the item itself, or the receiving units are being reorganized to adapt to new systems.

Table 1 is a partial "wrap-up" display of readiness, portrayed in percentages of units reporting C-3/R-3 or better for all Reserve Component units required to report readiness. An analysis of this table discloses that:

- Of the units that report readiness, 66 percent are rated combat ready (C-3/R-3) or better.
- The Army National Guard, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve reported that the number of units reporting C-3/R-3 or better have increased since FY 1984.
- The Army Reserve reported that the number of units reporting C-3 or better declined since FY 1984 due to two factors: (1) additional units coming into the force structure plus the conversion and reorganization of units; and (2) the rapid pace of modernization of equipment coming into the inventory.
- The Naval Reserve reported that the number of commissioned units reporting C-3 or better increased since FY 1984. The number of reinforcing/sustaining units reporting R-3 or better

**TABLE 1**  
**PROFILE OF UNIT READINESS AND MAJOR FACTORS**  
**LIMITING READINESS**

Component	% of Units C-3/R-3 or Better <sup>1</sup>			Limiting Factors, FY 1985	
	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	Most Critical	Second Most Critical
Army National Guard	62	58	80	Equipment On-Hand	Indiv. Skill Qualification
Army Reserve	41	42	40	Equipment On-Hand	Indiv. Skill Qualification
Naval Reserve					
Commissioned Units	77	87	88	Equipment Readiness	Training
Reinforcing/Sustaining (R-3)	35	77	76	Training	Personnel
Marine Corps Reserve	36	47	50	Equipment Readiness	Indiv. Skill Qualification
Air National Guard	69	71	83		
Flying Units			100	Equipment On-Hand	Equipment Readiness
Mission Support Units			82	Equipment Readiness	Equipment On-Hand
Air Force Reserve	83	71	76		
Flying Units			98	Equipment Readiness	Equipment On-Hand
Mission Support Units			67	Training	Personnel
<b>Overall DoD Selected Reserve</b>	% C-3/R-3 or Better <sup>1</sup>			Limiting Factors	
FY 1983		49		Equipment On-Hand	Indiv. Skill Qualification
FY 1984		64		Equipment On-Hand	Personnel
FY 1985		66		Equipment On-Hand	Equipment Readiness
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>	% R-3 or Better				
FY 1983		97		Logistics Readiness <sup>2</sup>	Training
FY 1984		94		Training	Personnel
FY 1985		97		Training	Personnel

Notes: 1 C-5 and Training Units are not counted. Mid year (April 30) data for FY 1983 and end of year (September 30) for FY 1984 and FY 1985.

2 Logistics Readiness refers to messing, berthing, logistics, and transportation and not to equipment shortages. To be consistent with the rating criteria for Navy reinforcing units, the Coast Guard dropped logistics from the reporting criteria in FY 1984.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

declined slightly since FY 1984, a result of several new units being added to the structure and being in the initial training stages during FY 1985.

- The two major limitations to Reserve Component readiness for FY 1985 were "Equipment On-Hand" and "Equipment Readiness."

### Army National Guard

In the Army National Guard, the percentage of units reporting C-3 or better increased 2% in FY 1985 compared with FY 1984 reported levels.

The major limiting factors in Army National Guard readiness for the FY 1985 reporting period were "Equipment On-Hand" and "Individual Skill Qualification."

A comparison of the categories of readiness, C-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel (Available)	+3	+1
• Indiv Skill Qualification	+4	-1
• Equipment On-Hand	-3	+5
• Equipment Readiness	-1	+1
• Training	+3	-1
• Overall*	-4	+2

\*The Overall category is a composite of the measured resource areas and is intended to indicate the change in percentage of reporting units C-3 or better.

### Army Reserve

In the Army Reserve, the percentage of units reporting C-3 or better decreased 2% in FY 1985 compared with FY 1984 reported levels.

The major limiting factors to Army Reserve readiness for the FY 1985 reporting period were "Equipment On-Hand" and "Individual Skill Qualification."

A comparison of the categories of readiness, C-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel	+5	-4
• Indiv Skill Qualification	+7	-4
• Equipment On-Hand	no change	-1
• Equipment Readiness	-2	no change
• Training	+2	-2
• Overall*	+1	-2

### Naval Reserve

In the Naval Reserve, the percentage of Commissioned units reporting C-3 or better increased 1% in FY 1985 compared with FY 1984 reported levels. Reinforcing/Sustaining units reporting R-3 or better declined 1% since FY 1984.

During the FY 1985 reporting period, the major limiting factors to Naval Reserve Commissioned unit readiness were "Equipment Readiness" and "Training." The major limiting factors to Naval Reserve Reinforcing and Sustaining unit readiness were "Training" and "Personnel."

A comparison of the categories of readiness, C-3/R-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	Commissioned Units		Reinforcing/ Sustaining Units	
	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel	+3	-5	+21	+3
• Equipment On-Hand	no change	+1	n/a	n/a
• Equipment Readiness	+4	-6	n/a	n/a
• Training	+3	-9	+39	-3
• Overall*	+10	+1	+42	-1

### Marine Corps Reserve

In the Marine Corps Reserve, the percentage of units reporting C-3 or better increased 3% in FY 1985 compared with FY 1984 reported levels.

The major limiting factors to Marine Corps Reserve readiness for the FY 1985 reporting period were "Equipment Readiness" and "Individual Skill Qualification."

A comparison of the categories of readiness, C-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel	+25	-4
• Equipment On-Hand	-2	+3
• Equipment Readiness	-6	+21
• Training	+6	-5
• Overall*	+11	+3

### Air National Guard

In the Air National Guard, the percentage of units reporting C-3 or better increased 12% in FY 1985 compared with FY 1984 reported levels. The major limiting factors to Air National Guard readiness for the FY 1985 reporting period were "Equipment Readiness" and "Equipment On-Hand."

A comparison of the categories of readiness, C-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel	+8	+2
• Equipment On-Hand	+8	+6
• Equipment Readiness	+4	no change
• Training	-1	+9
• Overall*	+2	+12

### Air Force Reserve

In the Air Force Reserve, the percentage of units reporting C-3 or better increased 5% in FY 1985. In comparison with the FY 1984 overall unit readiness, this result is commendable, especially when taking into account a FY 1985 personnel growth of 12% plus an increase of 8% in mission support units.

The major limiting factors to Air Force Reserve readiness for the FY 1985 reporting period were "Equipment Readiness" and "Equipment

\* The Overall category is a composite of the measured resource areas and is intended to indicate the change in percentage of reporting units C-3 or better.



On-Hand." Training was also a limiting factor because of the significant personnel increases.

A comparison of the categories of readiness, C-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel	-1	no change
• Equipment On-Hand	-14	+8
• Equipment Readiness	-34	+6
• Training	-7	-1
• Overall*	-12	+5

### Coast Guard Reserve

In the Coast Guard Reserve, the percentage of units reporting R-3 or better increased 3% in FY 1985 compared with FY 1984 reported levels.

The major limiting factors to Coast Guard Reserve readiness for the FY 1985 reporting period were "Training" and "Personnel."

A comparison of the categories of readiness, R-3 or better, between FY 1983-1984 and FY 1984-1985, shows the following:

	% Change FY83-84	% Change FY84-85
• Personnel	+1	+1
• Training	-8	+7
• Overall*	-3	+3

### SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board is pleased to note that most components increased their percentage of units C-3/R-3 or better during the FY 1985 reporting period. In addition, the Board believes that Reserve Component capability has increased during FY 1985 and is encouraged that this trend appears to be a continuation of that observed during FY 1983 and FY 1984.

Confusion and controversy still exist over DoD Total Force readiness measurement and reporting systems. The Board noted a glaring deficiency in the readiness reporting process while preparing the FY 1982 Readiness Assessment. From FY 1982 until the present, the Board has recommended that the measurement and reporting system receive attention and correction. The Board is pleased that the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act required a review of the various systems and a report to Congress describing a measurement system to be implemented to provide an objective and uniform evaluation of readiness. The Board reaffirms its recommendation and commends the efforts of the Secretary of Defense to correct this deficiency.

The Board recommends:

- ... a continuation of the effort by OSD to further improve DoD Total Force Readiness Measurement Systems. The goal of a standard readiness measurement and reporting system for all Services is attainable.

\*The Overall category is a composite of the measured resource areas and is intended to indicate the change in percentage of reporting units C-3 or better.

"The militia, sir, is our ultimate safety. We can have no security without it."

*Patrick Henry*

"...as all our great wars have been fought in the main by citizen armies...an organized citizen army reserve in time of peace is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of war."

*George C. Marshall*



## Chapter III

# PERSONNEL

### GENERAL

Management of change in the late 80's and early 90's promises to be an enormous challenge. Expanding missions, equipment modernization, mission conversions, the shrinking recruiting pool, and increased training requirements will have a profound impact on personnel requirements and the conduct of business in the Reserve Components.

Greater wartime strength requirements are projected for all Reserve Components as depicted in Table 2.

### RETENTION AND RECRUITING

People are our most precious asset. Without adequate numbers of skilled personnel, we cannot maintain credible Armed Forces.

In total strength, FY 1985 was another year with significant personnel gains. All of the Reserve Components met programmed end-strength with the exception of the Marine Corps Reserve which did achieve a notable gain of over 900 personnel.

Component	FY 85 Programmed End Strength	FY 85 Actual End Strength	Percent of Program
ARNG	438,383	439,952	100.4
USAR	285,646	292,080	102.3
USNR	128,700	129,832	100.9
USMCR	41,757	41,586	99.6
ANG	107,690	109,398	101.6
USAFR	74,829	75,214	100.5
TOTAL DoD	1,077,005	1,088,062	101.0
USCGR	12,500	12,590	100.7

FY 1985 started out as another year for the Services to improve the quality of the force. However, as the end of FY 1985 approached, there began to be signs

that recruiting higher quality individuals may be becoming more difficult. Aggressive programs for increasing strength, concurrent with force structure expansion, will require new and imaginative methods for attracting and retaining quality individuals.

### Retention

As long as a balanced force composed of members with the proper mix of age, grade and experience is maintained, improved retention is the preferred approach to solving strength problems. It costs thousands to train a single new recruit. Besides, every commander prefers retention of the quality individual who has the acquired military experience that can not be produced exclusively through the "school house." Retention is primarily a command problem. A challenging training program and sensitivity to needs of individuals and their families goes far in retaining personnel. Nonetheless, other factors play a key role. Career progression programs with a higher grade structure supported by adequate pay are necessary to retain personnel in critical skills.

Retention is being enhanced in some Reserve Components through the use of full-time Retention Non-Commissioned Officers. For example, the Army National Guard reduced the non Expiration of Term of Service (non-ETS) loss rate to 14.9% in FY 1984 from the FY 1983 high of 16.9%. Although the loss rate improvement seems small, it resulted in approximately 7,850 members being retained in FY 1984 who would otherwise have been lost. This represented an excellent return on investment as 7,850 fewer accessions were required, resulting in a savings of about \$80 million in accession and training costs. In FY 1985 the non-ETS loss rate improved to 14.6%, resulting in a savings of about \$86.4 million. The Army National Guard plans to expand the full time Retention NonCommissioned Officer Program in the future.

The retention rates for both officer and enlisted soldiers in the Selected Reserve of the Army Reserve

**TABLE 2**  
**RESERVE COMPONENTS**  
**WARTIME REQUIREMENT VS SELECTED RESERVE END STRENGTHS\***  
**(EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS)**

Component	1982	1983	1984	1985	% Growth 84-85	1986
<b>Army National Guard</b>						
Wartime Requirement	446.1	450.8	464.8	464.9	0.0	468.8
Actual Strength	407.6	417.2	434.3	440.0		
Percentage Attained	91.3	92.5	93.4	94.6		
<b>Army Reserve</b>						
Wartime Requirement	285.8	299.5	290.7	293.9	1.1	301.7
Actual Strength	256.7	266.2	275.1	292.1		
Percentage Attained	89.8	88.9	94.6	99.4		
<b>Naval Reserve</b>						
Wartime Requirement	119.0	125.0	130.7	139.5	6.7	147.9
Actual Strength	104.8	109.1	120.6	129.8		
Percentage Attained	88.1	87.3	92.3	93.0		
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>						
Wartime Requirement	40.4	40.6	41.4	40.5	-2.2	40.8
Actual Strength	40.5	42.7	40.6	41.6		
Percentage Attained	99.0	103.4	98.1	102.7		
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
Wartime Requirement	103.2	106.1	107.5	109.9	2.2	111.1
Actual Strength	100.7	102.2	105.0	109.4		
Percentage Attained	97.6	96.3	97.7	99.5		
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
Wartime Requirement	71.3	74.7	76.9	82.4	7.2	85.2
Actual Strength	64.4	67.2	70.3	75.2		
Percentage Attained	90.4	90.0	91.4	91.3		
<b>DoD Total</b>						
Wartime Requirement	1,065.8	1,096.7	1,112.0	1,131.1	1.7	1,155.5
Actual Strength	974.6	1,004.6	1,045.8	1,088.1		
Percentage Attained	91.4	91.6	94.0	96.1		
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>						
Wartime Requirement	22.0	22.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	27.5
Actual Strength	11.8	12.2	12.4	12.6		
Percentage Attained	53.6	55.5	49.6	50.4		
<b>Total</b>						
Wartime Requirement	1,087.8	1,118.7	1,137.0	1,156.1	1.7	1,183.0
Actual Strength	986.4	1,016.8	1,058.2	1,100.7		
Percentage Attained	90.7	90.9	93.1	95.2		

\*Source: Wartime Requirement: Individual Services

Actual Strength: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Data as of September 30, 1985.

are at a ten-year high. Of soldiers who were in the Selected Reserve a year ago, 81% were still there at the end of FY 1985. This retention rate is up from

the FY 1976 low of 67.5%. Improvements over the last few years result from a number of actions taken by the Congress, DoD, and the Services. Major ac-

tions include the enlistment of higher quality soldiers through the use of recruiting incentives, emphasis on completion of initial skill qualification training, and emphasis by commanders at all levels on retaining qualified and motivated soldiers until completion of their service obligation.

The importance of the family in retention of Reservists is increasingly being recognized, as research shows family attitudes exert a major influence on retention. Studies are being conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) on the demographics of Reserve Component members and their families, with plans to initiate future policy changes to enhance retention. These studies will also provide data to ensure that necessary support for Guard and Reserve families will be provided upon mobilization. In addition, the OSD Family Policy Coordinating Committee has a Guard/Reserve Subcommittee involved in developing programs for Reservists' families in order to aid retention.

### Recruiting

There are many programs underway to improve retention, but those programs alone can not be expected totally to solve strength needs. Additional recruiters will be required in order to overcome the tougher recruiting environment and the projected decreasing cohort of 18-21 year olds. The Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP), designed to support quality fill of critical skills and high priority units, and the new Reserve Component G.I. Bill will remain essential for meeting wartime unit and critical skill strength objectives. It is essential that SRIP and the new G.I. Bill be continued.

## INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

### The Need

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) provides a pool of trained individuals for use as fillers and replacements upon mobilization. The number of personnel required is dependent upon many factors, including the size and intensity of the wartime scenario being considered. Nonetheless, there is general agreement that the size of the pool must be increased to meet wartime requirements, otherwise many existing Selected Reserve units will have to be broken up for use as individual replacements after mobilization. In addition, there must be a program to keep skills current, to retain or retrain so as to correct skill imbalances, and to administer the system so that adequate numbers of personnel can be quickly accessed. Congressional enactment and continued support of the IRR bonus program has resulted in improved retention of personnel with critical skills. The Board encourages continued support of this low cost but effective program. The IRR strength projections are displayed in Table 3.

### Progress Thus Far

The Army has by far the greatest need for fillers and replacements and therefore the greatest prob-

lem. However, the extension of the military service obligation from six to eight years will result in an IRR strength increase beginning in FY 1990. Solutions to enhance the Army IRR are being aggressively addressed by the Army Reserve Components Coordinating Council. In addition, a one-day procedural test involving a voluntary IRR muster at three sites was conducted on three weekends in September 1985. A screening was accomplished during the muster to include a modified physical exam, a common skill test, a personal data update, and a check on the condition of uniforms. The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), a field operating agency of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, manages the IRR program for the Army.

### Future Musters

The Army plans future musters, to include the same screening as administered during the muster in September 1985:

- **January 1986.** A voluntary muster of 5000 IRR soldiers during two weekends at 12 locations. This muster was directed by Congress in the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986.
- **1986.** A voluntary muster of 15,000 IRR soldiers at 50 locations, 5000 during each of three musters in the February-September time frame.
- **1987.** Implementation of the DoD mandatory annual screening program which requires at least one day of active duty each year for members of the IRR.


## FULL-TIME SUPPORT

### General

Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel are essential to the Reserve Components and are needed to assist in achieving the levels of readiness required. Full-time support means more available manpower in peacetime for operating and maintaining equipment, for training, for developing mobilization and exercise plans, and for personnel management and supervision. The FTS structure assists Reserve Component unit members to optimize their training time without devoting inordinate amounts of time in performing administrative functions which do not contribute directly to an advanced state of readiness. A major advantage of full-time support is the full-time availability of key unit personnel who are highly skilled and trained to perform the day-to-day mission requirements associated with the wartime mission and with readiness and training of the reservists.

Increased levels of full-time support have enhanced capabilities, readiness, and responsiveness. Full-time support ranges from 10% in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to 29% in the Air National Guard. Total full-time support is programmed to increase by 57,651 or 38%, from FY 1985 to FY 1991. This increase reflects a significant commitment to improve the readiness and capability of the Reserve Components as an essential element of the Total

**TABLE 3**  
**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE/INACTIVE**  
**NATIONAL GUARD STRENGTH**




Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense  
 (Reserve Affairs)

Data as of September 30, 1985

Force. The current level of full-time support manning is shown in Table 4.

It must also be recognized that there is not a unified approach among Reserve Components regarding the mix of categories of full-time support personnel. Each Service has structured its full-time support

program to best suit the unique needs of its Reserve Component(s). In addition to the foregoing, the Board is concerned that civilian strength restrictions have not allowed adequate growth in full-time support to match increased strength levels in the Reserve Components.



### Categories of Full-Time Support

- **AC Active Component Personnel:** Military personnel on active duty who provide support to the Reserve Components and are paid from Active Component personnel appropriations. This classification includes all Coast Guard military personnel assigned to full-time support billets.
- **AGR Active Guard/Reserve:** Guard/Reserve members on active duty 180 days or more who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components and are paid from the Reserve Person-

nel Appropriations of the Military Departments concerned. This classification includes Naval Reserve Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) personnel.

- **CS Competitive Civil Service Personnel:** Federal competitive civil service personnel other than Military Technicians who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components but do not occupy technician positions. Commonly known as either "civilians" or "DoD Civilians," they are not required to be members of the Selected Reserve.

**TABLE 4  
FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL  
FY 1985 ACTUAL END STRENGTH**

	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Naval Reserve</u>	<u>Marine Corps Reserve</u>	<u>Air National Guard</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve</u>	<u>Overall</u>	<u>Coast Guard Reserve</u>	<u>Total</u>
AC	911	5,393	5,847	5,180	721	743	18,795	599 <sup>1</sup>	19,394
AGR	21,059	10,751	15,012	1,134	6,399	570	54,895	—	64,895
CS	2,149	6,099	3,081	221	2,474	4,772	18,796	118	18,914
MT	23,789	7,857	—	—	22,145	8,084	61,835	—	61,835
Actual Full-Time Support End Strength <sup>2</sup>	47,888	30,100	23,940	6,535	31,709	14,149	154,321	717	185,038
Actual Selected Reserve End Strength	439,952	292,080	129,832	41,588	109,398	75,214	1,088,062	12,590	1,100,852

Notes: <sup>1</sup>There are 73 Reserve Program Administrators (RPA) included in the 599. These 73 are indicated as AGR by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) in the September 1985 issue of RCS: DD: M(M)1147/1148.

<sup>2</sup>Includes all categories of full-time support.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for DoD data.  
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard (G-RSP) for DOT Data.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

- **MT Military Technicians:** Federal civilian personnel who occupy technician positions and generally are members of the Reserve Component which they support.

The influx of full-time support personnel has greatly improved readiness and mobilization capabilities in all of the Reserve Components. The Board supports the emphasis being placed on this program and urges continued funding of personnel requested for future growth. In addition, programs must offer career development and opportunity for all personnel in the full-time support system.


### MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Medical manpower shortages are a concern of the Board, a fact manifested by a separate chapter devoted to that subject in Annual Reports by the Board over the last two years. While these shortages remain a concern, the Board is gratified by the progress made by the Services in recruiting and retaining medical professionals, particularly physicians. Congressional concern is evident by the numerous hearings which have examined the issue of Active and Reserve ability to respond quickly in treating projected wartime casualties. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and his staff,

strongly supported by the Secretary of Defense, have placed the highest priority on improving the numbers and quality of medical personnel. In response, the Guard and Reserve have initiated programs to assist in the retention, recruiting, and training of professional medical personnel and better provide combat medical care in wartime. Examples of actions taken include:

- **Medical Detachments at Medical Schools:** Reserve medical units have been located at select medical schools to stimulate interest in military membership and renew liaison with the medical academic community.
- **Medical Early Direct Commissioning Program:** This program is designed to attract medical students into the Reserve Components.
- **Reserve Flexibility Programs:** This provides flexible training or drill programs to accommodate the schedules of busy health care specialists.
- **Continuing Health Education to Enhance Readiness (CHEER):** This program helps health care officers maintain and enhance their professional skills through attendance at approved health care education courses in a military pay status.


TABLE 5  
COMPOSITION OF THE TOTAL FORCES, 1975-1988



- Sources:
1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
  2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
  3. Department of Defense Military Manpower Statistics (DIOR) Sept. 1984.
  4. Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard (G-RSP)

Data as of September 30, 1985

TABLE 6  
**PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE**  
**SELECTED RESERVE MEMBERS**  
**FY 1985**



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
 (Reserve Affairs)

Data as of September 30, 1985

- **Wartime Alignment of Reserve and Active Medical Systems:** This program integrates Active and Reserve Components training, so those who may work together in wartime train together in peacetime.

## TOTAL FORCE

### Composition of the Total Force

Larger wartime strength requirements and increased strength in the Selected Reserve resulting from improved retention and recruiting have caused growth of the Reserve Component share of the Total Force as shown in Table 5. At the end of the fiscal year, Ready Reserve strength was 1,628,773 individuals (of which Selected Reserve strength numbered 1,100,652) versus 2,189,627 in the Active

Components. Thus, 43% of the immediately available Armed Forces of the United States is composed of members of the Reserve Components.

Table 5 displays the composition of the Total Force.

### Partners in the Total Force

A force size comparison using percentages of end strength in the Active and Selected Reserve Components for each of the Services is shown in Table 6. As a force structure comparison, the IRR is not included.

### Contributions to the Total Force

Each component of the Selected Reserve makes substantial contributions to its parent Service. While some missions are placed entirely in the



Selected Reserve (generally missions required only during wartime), other missions are found exclusively in the Active Components. A representation of those missions found in the Selected Reserve are presented in tabular form for each Service in Appendix B.

## ROPA/ROPMA

The Board is required by 10 USC 133(c)(3) to review specifically Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the Reserve Components. With passage of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1981, the counterpart Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) for the Reserve Components is long overdue. The Board has participated in the DoD process of producing for that purpose a proposed amendment of ROPA and fully supports passage of the proposed ROPMA legislative package. The ROPMA proposal has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget and was returned to DoD for minor revisions in December 1985 prior to resubmittal. Passage of this needed legislation should be expedited.

## OTHER ISSUES

The Board has adopted formal positions on other personnel-related issues. These issues of continued interest to the Board are summarized below:

- **Commissary Privileges.** The DoD Authorization Act of 1984 directed a test to change the commissary privileges of Reservists to permit "banking" of the currently authorized days from ADT for flexible use anytime during the 12 months following ADT. The test resulted in minimal impact on the commissary system, but OMB and DoD opposed legislation to "expand" commissary privileges of Reservists. The Board believes that the proposal is not an expansion or additional benefit, but a reallocation of an existing benefit to permit reservists more effectively to take advantage of their privilege. Adoption would be beneficial to the Reserve Components.
- **Expansion of 100K Call-up Authority.** As more missions are transferred to the Reserve Components, there is an expanded need for authority to call-up Selected Reservists. Authority to call-up 100,000 no longer meets the need for some scenarios. The Board support legislation to increase to 200,000 from 100,000 the call-up authority in 10 USC 673(b). Regardless of the size of the call-up authority, it is important that the decision to call-up Reservists be made as early as possible.
- **General and Flag Officer Accountability.** Certain General and Flag Officer positions were created by the Congress in order to permit the Reserve Components to administer and manage their own components. At present these positions are counted against Active Component grade ceiling accounts. It should be noted that Reserve officers below General and Flag rank are not accountable against Active Component ceilings under the new DOPMA law. The Board believes that legislation should be passed to exclude certain active duty Reserve forces positions (which may be filled by Reserve General or Flag Officers on active duty) from Active Component grade ceiling accountability.
- **Low Cost/No Cost Benefits for Retired Guard and Reserve Members.** Many members with twenty or more good years enter a "gray period" from the time they enter the Retired Reserve until eligible to receive retired benefits at age 60. Though they are eligible for recall after they leave the Selected Reserve and prior to age 60, there is no incentive for them to remain in acceptable physical condition. The Board supports the provision of low cost/no cost benefits to Retired Reservists such as Post Exchange privileges and space available travel in exchange for an annual update from the reservist on his current address and health.
- **National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.** Increasing demands on personnel in the Guard and Reserve, such as increased training time, are affecting reservists' relationships with their employers. The scope of activities of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve should be expanded through the addition of more personnel, resources, and advertising support. The committee would then be in a better position to improve Guard and Reserve personnel retention by resolving conflicts with employers, as well as by enhancing support generally.
- **Reduced Fares for Distant Weekend Drills.** Many Reservists travel extended distances to reach weekend training sites. At present they receive neither recompense for travel nor reduced fares. The Military Traffic Management Command has requested the General Services Administration to consider letting reservists use government fares in the next contract solicitation. Carriers should permit members of the Reserve Components to travel to Inactive Duty Training (IDT) sites using "City Pair" or government rates, as do Active Component members traveling to temporary duty locations.
- **Reserve Health Care Benefits.** There are inequities in benefits provided reservists or their survivors when reservists are disabled or killed while on tours of 30 days or less, or while traveling to or from Inactive Duty Training. The Board forwarded this issue to the OASD(RA) in September of 1984 for study and for proposal of corrective legislation. The OASD(RA) asked the Army to take the lead on this issue. The Army proposed omnibus legislation which is now being coordinated in DoD. If enacted, the legislation would correct many of the problems of concern to the

Board. The Board therefore supports submission and passage of the Omnibus Health Care Benefits Act of 1985.

- **Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (as amended).** This Act provides protection from eviction of dependents without a court order upon a service member's activation or mobilization for military duty. The limitation on monthly rental was last updated in 1966, raising the amount from \$80 to \$160. Rental rates have greatly increased since 1966. This Act should be amended to raise the monthly rent figure to a realistic level, with a provision for automatic adjustment so that frequent legislative updates will not be required.
- **Survivors' Benefit Plan.** The Survivors' Benefit Plan Amendment of 1985 has an adverse impact on the Reserve Components. Under the revised plan, for example, the surviving spouse of a Reserve Component soldier who retired as a Sergeant First Class E-7 would receive about \$1000 a year less than under the previous plan. Reservists previously eligible under the plan are grandfathered. The Board suspects that the adverse impact on future reservists was unintentional and urges amending legislation to correct the situation.
- **Widows' Pension Entitlements.** Surviving spouses of Reserve Component members eligible for retired pay, who died on or after October 1, 1978, without having attained age 60, are eligible for a survivor annuity. Surviving spouses of Reserve Component members eligible for retirement who died prior to that date are not eligible for a survivor annuity. A needs-based survivors' annuity program should be developed for those not presently covered.

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Individual Ready Reserve is an important element of the Total Force, and a continuing concern of the Board. Although the recent attention given to the IRR is gratifying, continued attention is required.

Increased demands on the Reserve Components to attain higher levels of readiness have increased pressures on relationships with employers and families. Programs to alleviate those problems must continue to receive emphasis.

The Board is beginning to hear concerns expressed about difficulties in attaining recruiting goals. As the eligible cohort shrinks and demands for strength increases grow, the Board will monitor the success of the Reserve Components in competing for that cohort to assess adequacy of retention and recruiting resources plus incentives provided to meet the need.

It is imperative that the programmed growth in full-time support personnel be implemented as planned in conjunction with the modernization which is so critical to the increasing Guard and Reserve role in national defense.

The Board recommends:

- ... that the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and the new G.I. Bill be continued.
- ... that the IRR system be strengthened. The size of the pool must be increased. Individual skills and addresses must be kept current and skill imbalances corrected. Increased resources must be made available to satisfy management, screening, and training requirements for the IRR.
- ... that the full-time support program be increased and fully funded.
- ... that full-time civilian personnel employed by the Reserve Components, both military technician and non-technician, be authorized and accounted for separately from total DoD civilian personnel levels.
- ... that the proposed Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) legislation be enacted.
- ... that reservists be permitted to "bank" commissary privileges for use throughout the year.
- ... that legislation be passed to increase the call-up authority from 100,000 to 200,000.
- ... that legislation be passed to exclude certain positions filled by Reserve-General and Flag Officers from Active Component grade ceiling accountability when those positions were created by Congress to permit the Reserve Components to administer and manage their own components.
- ... that certain low cost/no cost benefits be provided Retired Reservists who are currently ineligible for benefits until they reach age 60.
- ... that the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve be enhanced to provide greater support for retention programs in the Guard and Reserve.
- ... that "City Pair" or government rates be granted by carriers to permit members of the Reserve Components to travel to Inactive Duty Training (IDT) sites at reduced fares, as do Active Component members traveling to temporary duty locations.
- ... that the Omnibus Health Care Benefits Act of 1985 be passed.
- ... that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 be further amended to reflect realistic monthly rental rates and that the legislation include provisions for adjustment of these rates without further amendments.
- ... that legislation be prepared and passed to correct the adverse impact on Reserve Component personnel caused by the Survivors' Benefit Plan Amendment of 1985.
- ... that a needs-based survivors' annuity program be developed for surviving spouses of Reserve Component members not presently covered.



## Chapter IV

# TRAINING

### GENERAL

Training conducted by Reserve Component units in FY 1985 reflected a continuing focus on real-world mission oriented training. The Board is pleased to note the increasingly significant training activities conducted by many units, and the Board appreciates the resultant contributions to readiness of the Total Force.

Since the nation can no longer rely on early warning to accommodate extensive post mobilization training, combat readiness must be attained in peacetime. The constraint of time available for training in peacetime remains a major limiting factor. It demands optimization of limited resources. As missions become more diverse and demanding and equipment more sophisticated, trainers will face an increasing challenge in the development of peacetime training programs to reduce post mobilization training requirements.

Increasingly the Reserve Components are relying on training devices and simulators as essential tools in developing a combat ready force. The Board fully endorses the increased use of training devices and simulators to assist in overcoming time and resource constraints faced by the reservist.

Equally as important, training opportunities must be provided that closely approximate wartime conditions in order to develop and maintain full capabilities of the Reserve Components. Increased participation in JCS and Service-directed and coordinated exercises throughout the world has provided the challenging environment within which the Guard and Reserve personnel and units must train.

Training highlights for the Reserve Components are described in Appendix C.

### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE

To assure that training devices and simulators are brought into the Guard and Reserve as early as practical, the Army has formed a Reserve Component training device ad hoc working group. This group

serves as the primary action agency for procuring training devices for the Reserve Components. This acquisition effort is proceeding in two broad categories: high-cost, low-density devices (e.g., Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and conduct-of-fire trainers), and low-cost, high-density devices (e.g., map reading trainers, subcaliber devices and dummy mines). The FY 1985 budget provided \$37.3 million for MILES and Tank Video Disc Gunnery training devices. The FY 1986 increment has been approved and provides \$53.2M for the purchase of MILES platoon sets, Tank Gunnery and Missile Target Systems, Dragon Launch Environment Simulators, Stinger Launch Simulators, direct support/general support maintenance panel trainers, and XM-81 chemical alarm simulators. Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations will be made available for joint use by Guard and Reserve personnel at Regional Training Sites and other common training areas.

Armor and Cavalry units are receiving training at Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho, to transition their personnel to newer tracked vehicles which have recently come into the National Guard inventory. This facility has proved to be of great value to units rotating through the training. Because of extensive distances and associated costs and limitations on the numbers of units that can effectively use the center, the ARNG plans to activate a similar center in the East.

A simulator-related facility to help sustain unit proficiency and individual soldier skills is being constructed at Ft. Dix, New Jersey. The use of such a facility should considerably enhance the readiness of units in the densely populated areas of the Northeast where training space is very limited.

Aviation training sites (one presently at Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, and one to be established in FY 1987) will provide individual aviation qualification training and supplemental tactical training. These facilities will eventually operate helicopter gunship flight/weapons simulators to support readiness goals of Army National Guard avia-

tion forces which now comprise approximately 30 percent of Total Army aviation assets.

Regional maintenance training sites are being established and equipped to provide transition and sustainment skill training for Reserve Component members on the Army's newest weapon, vehicle, aircraft, and maintenance systems. Each Reserve Component should be required to evaluate training programs to ensure that all personnel who will use or maintain the "new" equipment upon mobilization are provided the necessary skill training at these sites. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) provides several of its facilities for this type of training and is planning to expand its support if needed. There are measurable paybacks also for AMC as some of the Reserve Component units provide maintenance assistance and transportation of stocks and materiel to airfields and ports.

### NAVAL RESERVE

The Naval Reserve is taking several new approaches to increase training readiness while cutting costs. Active Component training facilities are being opened on weekends. This makes the same classroom and training devices accessible to Selected Reservists as to Active Component counterparts. This provides significant savings over purchasing duplicate facilities and equipment for Reserve Component sites. Both NAVTAG, a computer based war gaming tactics trainer, and Interactive Video, a computer based troubleshooting trainer for technical systems training, are becoming more widespread throughout the Reserve Component community. These reduce the requirement for additional facilities, ships, and weapon systems to support training requirements. An increase in shipboard simulators and damage control trainers allows more widespread training in "mid-America." This development reduces the requirement to divert operational assets to the training environment and makes training possible where asset diversion is impossible.

The Readiness Center Concept has been approved for implementation nationwide. A Readiness Center is a large reserve activity designed, equipped, and staffed to provide state-of-the-art technical and hands-on training for Selected Reservists. This initiative will concentrate resources (technical training equipment, training devices, and instructors) to improve the overall quality of reserve training. The Readiness Center will supplement other training initiatives to improve individual and unit readiness.

### MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The Marine Corps Reserve program of training encompasses the full spectrum of formal schooling, on-the-job training, range and simulator use, and exercise participation. The use of devices and simulators for Marine Air-Ground Task Force training falls into four general categories: Marksmanship/Gunnery, Combat Environment, Command/Control, and Maintenance Training. Devices and simulators are

employed either for exclusive Marine Corps Reserve use or as part of active bases and facilities utilized by Reservists during drills and Annual Training.

Ranges or range devices include the Multipurpose Range Complex, the Mid-Atlantic Electronic Warfare Training Range, Small Arms Remote Targets, Remote Engagement Target System, Electronic Target System, and Training Range Analysis System. Marksmanship/Gunnery devices and simulators include target simulators, the Precision Gunnery Training System, the Light Armored Vehicle gunnery trainer, and the Training Set Fire Observer (for training artillery forward observers).

Simulation for combat is accomplished with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), the Air Ground Engagement System (AGES), the Simulated Projectile Air Liquid for NBC training, the Mobile Independent Target System, the Area Weapons Effect Simulator, Simulated Laser Targets, Electronic Warfare Simulator Suite, and Ground Threat Radar Simulator. Realistic air to air engagements are scored and recorded on the Tactical Air Combat Training System (TACTS) located at the Marine Corps Air Station at Yuma, Arizona, Tyndall and Nellis Air Force Bases. Marine Corps Reserve fighter and attack aircraft regularly deploy to perform TACTS training.

Command and Control training is aided by systems and devices such as the Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis System; manual wargames, including TACWAR at the company level and Steelthrust at the battalion level; and the Combined Arms Simulation Trainer used by Marine Reserve Air Ground Task Forces deploying to Combined Arms Exercises at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. Marine Air Control Squadrons use the 15A19 Radar Simulator to exercise the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) in practice air defense scenarios. Simulated datalink operations are also conducted, using leaselines between Reserve MACCS agencies. Tactical Training Situation Exercises provide self-paced instruction for groups and individuals in preparation for staff action in execution of OPLANS, contingency plans, and major exercises.

Games are available for instruction in occupational fields to help individuals train in their occupational specialties. Maintenance training will be aided by the fielding of generic panel trainers for troubleshooting in minor transport and radar maintenance.

The Marine Corps Reserve is now identifying simulator needs specific to the low density training requirements prevalent in training sites scattered across the nation.

### AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve indicate that there is no direct correlation between dollars saved and simulator use since they do not

substitute simulator hours for flying hours. Savings are realized as a by-product of simulator training. This training has a direct effect on flying safety which will impose even higher demands as they receive more high performance aircraft. Recent simulator conversions and additions have improved simulator training capability. Both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve fully support the Air Force Simulator program.

### SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board supports challenging, mission oriented, real-world training for the Reserve Components. Reserve Components must maintain a state of training readiness that will enable them to mobilize, fight, and win on the modern battlefield. Maximum use of training time is essential, regardless of the length of the training period. Congress should continue funding additional training requirements for units participating in specialized training or exercises. However, no attempt should be made to man-

date additional training requirements for all elements of the Reserve Components.

The Board is pleased with the progress made in placing training devices and simulators in locations where they can be shared by all components. Comments from the field continue to highlight their importance in meeting the training demands of advanced technology. Their use has resulted in dollar savings, enhanced training, more efficient use of training time, and, most important of all, increased combat readiness. Future programming actions should continue to ensure the placement and availability that best benefits all components who utilize similar equipment.

The Board recommends:

- . . . that funding and use of training aids and simulators be increased to assist in overcoming the time and resource constraints faced by reservists.
- . . . that funding of exercises and overseas training be continued at planned levels.

“

“To thrust untrained citizens into the field is nothing short of death by Government order.”

*Elihu Root*


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“Our concept for the defense of Europe is based on the maintenance of highly trained covering land forces, backed by reserve units which would be brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities.”

*Alfred M. Gruenther*

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## Chapter V

# EQUIPMENT

### GENERAL

In 1982, Secretary of Defense Weinberger established the "First to Fight, First to Equip" policy to ensure that units planned for early deployment would be adequately equipped for their mission regardless of component. Under this policy, which is being actively implemented by the Services, Reserve Component units are interspersed in the equipment distribution plans of each Service according to their assigned employment dates. Early deploying units are relatively well-equipped while shortages can be a very severe problem in later deploying units. Thus, there is a wide disparity in the distribution of equipment among Reserve Component units.

During FY 1985, a significant amount of new equipment was distributed to the Reserve Components. This included new tanks and other tracked vehicles, guided-missile frigates, a variety of aircraft, small arms, wheeled vehicles and other equipment. There has also been a redistribution of good, recent-vintage equipment into the Reserve Components from the Active Components as the Active Components received even newer items from assembly lines. In some cases, such as the DC-9 aircraft for the Naval Reserve, there has been a direct purchase of used equipment to meet special requirements. Equipment has also been redistributed within each Reserve Component to ensure availability of equipment for training of similar units. Plans for acquisition and distribution must always identify well in advance where the equipment is to be assigned to ensure that adequate storage and maintenance can be provided for the equipment.

As this modernization takes place and transition programs are developed for effective use of the new equipment, the Services, in most instances, have provided a maintenance infrastructure to sustain the modernization. This maintenance base is essential to the continuing modernization effort. The Army has implemented a plan to field new equipment generally by unit. In those cases, packages of spare parts and training resources have been provided simultaneously with the operational items.

### CRITICAL EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

Critical shortages for the Reserve Components remain in communications and electronics equipment and in modern aircraft.

Communications and electronic equipment includes field phones, data processing equipment, various radios, radars, night vision devices, generators, electronic countermeasures items, communication terminals, test equipment, etc. The Services continue to provide this type of equipment to their Reserve Components but on-hand equipment shortages remain a significant problem.

There are not enough modern automated management information systems in the Reserve Components. If management of equipment distribution and status, personnel strength and status, individual and unit training, facilities, etc., is to be effective and used for decision-making based on accurate and timely information, data processing systems in the Active and Reserve Components must become more accessible. Modern hardware technology and related data based management systems made standardization less important than the transfer linkages and software which are necessary to convert data into useful information. Joint procurement and development must be centrally coordinated to avoid unnecessary expenditures. Although these systems are expensive, they are necessary on a wide scale if the many changes taking place in the Reserve Components are to be managed effectively.

The Army National Guard has developed a management program that readily shows how equipment can be redistributed within a state or between units to increase readiness. Data has been included "on one document" to enable planners to better see how to make equipment distribution or shifts. The program is now also being fielded in the Army and Army Reserve.

Aircraft aging is a problem in all of the Reserve Components. The problem is not limited to that of flyable aircraft but is compounded by compatibility issues and survivability of aircraft on the modern battlefield. Modifications have been and are being

**TABLE 7**  
**COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AIRCRAFT AGE FOR THE ACTIVE,**  
**GUARD AND RESERVE\***  
**(EXPRESSED IN YEARS)**

Aircraft	Army			Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force <sup>1</sup>			Coast Guard <sup>2</sup>	
	Active	Guard	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Guard	Reserve	Active <sup>3</sup>	Reserve
<b>Fixed Wing:</b>												
Bomber								23.0				
Attack				13.4	18.2	10.1	18.1	5.8	10.8	8.4		
Fighter/Interceptor				7.5	14.9	11.6	17.9	8.7	19.7	15.9		
Cargo/Transport	12.9	17.1	23.7	21.5	7.7			15.2	21.4	24.0		
Tankers				2.8	25.4	18.8	13.7	23.2	26.8	26.7		
ASW Patrol				10.9								
Observation/Recon	19.5	20.3	17.6	14.5	18.4	17.6	17.1	16.7	19.4	19.9		
AEW				11.9	14.2	8.0	16.0					
Trainer	20.3		21.5	11.9	16.8			21.5	28.4			
Rescue								17.8	19.3	18.9	3.0	
Other								15.5	12.8		19.0	
<b>Helicopters:</b>												
Attack	12.0	15.5			15.3	10.4	14.8					
Utility	13.0	17.8	17.7	17.6		10.0	14.2					
Observation	14.6	15.5	14.4									
Cargo	13.7	18.9	19.7			14.8	17.9					
Rescue					19.6						15.8	
ASW				18.7	22.4							
Trainer	17.9	18.7										
Other	18.8	16.6										
<b>All Helicopters</b>								15.7	18.3	16.4		

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Calendar age of Aircraft as of September 30, 1985 Inventory AF/PRPS.

<sup>2</sup> Aircraft belong to Active Component.

<sup>3</sup> Aircraft generally perform multiple missions, often simultaneously.

\* Average age is not shown in every category because of the following reasons:

1. No equipment/aircraft of this type exists within the inventory of the respective component(s); or

2. Average age computations were made by consolidating several types of equipment/aircraft data, including newer aircraft systems.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

applied to some older aircraft to assist in effective accomplishment of their wartime mission. Many of the aircraft (and other types of equipment), however, are reaching the end of their service life and are not being replaced or upgraded. Examples include the C-130s in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve and the Naval Reserve P-3A and B aircraft. There has been a limited buy of upgraded P-3Cs for the Active Component so there is limited availability of the earlier models for the Naval Reserve. Compatibility of aircraft, because of age, is a primary issue for the Marine Corps and its Reserve Component. Sustainability of a unit in battle can be questioned when there are shortages of spare parts or ammunition for those units with aging equipment. This affects all types of units whether performing combat, combat support or combat service

support roles. Table 7 depicts average ages of aircraft for the Active and Reserve Components of each Service.

## TRAINING EQUIPMENT

Each Service must determine for its Reserve Component(s) the optimum and minimum equipment requirements to accomplish the training mission and attain and maintain unit readiness. Equipment for training requirements can be reduced in many situations by using simulators and training devices. Use of such items should be maximized in the Reserve Components because of their limited training time and unique training requirements. Although in most cases, units have enough equipment to conduct training to at least a minimum



level of efficiency, equipment for war is often limited. It is important to note that this adverse condition does not prevent a unit from having a "fighting" capability; it does, however, reduce the wartime effectiveness of the unit until it can be properly equipped.

A true capability picture based on equipment is difficult to portray. A unit's readiness rating may be lowered because of modern equipment introduction and insufficient training on the new equipment at the time of the rating evaluation. However, the unit may have a significantly increased warfighting capability. It may also have, on the other hand, non-deployable assets, very old equipment or substitute items for which spare parts or ammunition in a wartime theater may be limited. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, readiness reporting and capability status are not synonymous.

### **MEDICAL EQUIPMENT**

Medical care of the wounded, as noted previously, continues to be a concern of the Board. Because the Reserve Components will provide so much of the required casualty care, equipment must be provided up to authorized fill. In addition, the in-theater prepositioning of hospital equipment and medical supplies (as shelf-life will allow) and predesignated operating room space are essential. The Board is pleased that progress in this area is being made and that increased attention to wartime medical treatment has been given recently by the Department of Defense.

### **POMCUS AND STAY-BEHIND EQUIPMENT**

Most of the Services preposition overseas a portion of their wartime requirements for equipment and ammunition. In most cases these are packaged according to units such as the Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) for Army divisions in Europe. Although four POMCUS sets are complete, sets five and six have had their fill dates delayed significantly. All prepositioned materiel reduces strategic lift requirements for follow-on forces and can be a force sustainer or combat multiplier. If POMCUS storage facilities are not available in the theater, DoD should consider the prepositioning of unit sets at U.S. ports of embarkation or at predesignated mobilization stations. When deployed, stateside-based units will fall-in on this prepositioned equipment and leave behind their equipment that is no longer required. The Board is concerned as to whether or not this stay-behind equipment has been properly assigned for allocation to other units (including, obviously, Reserve Component forces) or properly taken into account in determining and counting equipment shortages.

### **CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS**

In FY 1985, Congress added \$380 million in separate appropriations for Guard and Reserve equipment to the amounts found in the DoD budget

request. Of the \$380 million, \$141 million was appropriated for specified items such as armored personnel carriers, vehicles, and unit supplies. The remaining \$239 million was for unspecified items except that up to \$5 million was for A-7D/K ejection seats in Air National Guard aircraft. Separate FY 1985 appropriations for Guard and Reserve equipment increased \$204 million over that funding provided in FY 1984. The above FY 1985 Congressional additions supplemented the approximately \$1,247.3 million that the Services earmarked for equipment in their Reserve Components.

Last spring, the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services proposed for DoD consideration that the most modern equipment be issued to units that show the best performance. If substandard performance by a unit was due to the lack of equipment or to training on newer equipment, the problem of poor performance or low readiness ratings would be compounded by the "rich getting richer, and the poor getting poorer." Performance is a good way to measure training and equipment status. However, units should not be penalized for substandard performance which can be directly attributed to problems of equipment distribution by the parent Service. The Board opposes any action which will evaluate units for "best performance" to determine equipment distribution in the Reserve Components. Equipment distribution should continue to be based on the "first to fight, first to be equipped" policy.

Congressman Montgomery in January 1985 presented seven initiatives designed to improve the readiness capabilities of the Reserve Components. One of the initiatives related to equipment. He announced:

"If our Guard and Reserve units are going to be required to respond as part of the nation's Total Force, they must be equipped to do the job. In the past, state-of-the-art equipment has not always found its way to the reserve units. I, therefore, plan to take action which will require the Services to submit their procurement requests to Congress in a manner that will clearly display their plan for fully equipping the Reserve Forces with specific equipment, or with acceptable combat deployable equipment in lieu thereof. I am in favor of fully equipping those units now in place on the basis of their war time missions, i.e., the first to respond should be the first to be equipped."

—Press Conference, 28 January 1985

The Board is pleased with the extent of Congressional interest in providing training and operational equipment to the Reserve Components, and it sincerely appreciates visible support such as that so well demonstrated by Congressman Montgomery.

### **ANNUAL EQUIPMENT REPORT**

Legislation to carry out Congressman Montgomery's initiative was introduced, and the ap-



proved FY 1986 DoD Authorization Act amended Section 138(b), Title 10 USC regarding the Annual Report on Guard and Reserve Equipment. It now requires more information than previous reports so that Reserve Component equipment needs can be better analyzed—particularly as they relate to deployment, wartime requirements, and acquisition and distribution plans.

The Board commends the efforts of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to make the "National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report" a better tool. That report now helps with equipment acquisition and distribution strategies for the Reserve Components and with evaluating the equipment posture of each of the Reserve Components for both peacetime and mobilization missions. The Board for several years has recommended that nondeployable and substitute equipment be accurately identified to determine the extent of equipment problems. Two aspects of this year's reporting instructions to the Services promise to provide a more accurate picture of overall Defense capabilities and requirements. Specifically, the Services will be providing a list of substitute items in conjunction with this year's report; and secondly, items which are not deployable are excluded from being reported as on-hand assets against a wartime requirement.

The Board continues to believe that, in addition to the above report, nondeployable and substitute items issued to units (Active and Reserve Components) in lieu of the required standard articles should be accounted for and reported separately on UNITREP. When not reported, the extent of the problem of the impact of first-line equipment shortfalls is obscured and war-planners are not given sufficient information for rational decision-making on unit employment to support various operations plans and scenarios.

## COMPATIBILITY

The Services cannot afford to have their capabilities degraded because of equipment compatibility problems between their Active and Reserve Components. An example is artillery pieces which should be re-tubed so that they can fire the full family of munitions which are available to the modern force today. Another example is the Army's new TRI-TAC communications system which includes automatic switching. Most Guard and Reserve communications equipment has manual switching devices which are not compatible with the new system. The Board is pleased to note that the Army does have an integrated strategy for communications acquisition that will improve interoperability among its Active and Reserve Components.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has a study contracted to determine the extent of the equipment compatibility problem between the Active and Reserve Components. The final report is due in September 1986 and will be carefully reviewed by the Board.

Compatibility of equipment goes beyond the hardware problem. When two different systems with the same basic mission requirements are employed in the same theater, separate manpower training "pipelines" are necessary. This raises recruiting and training space requirements, and increases requirements for trainers. The Services must program adequate support for Reserve Component equipment in the wartime theater and in the stateside training base where commonality and compatibility of equipment is not always feasible.

## EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

Force structuring in the Services is a dynamic activity. Recent decisions have affected wartime requirements and equipment fill rates for the Reserve Components. Examples include: the organization of new mechanized and light infantry divisions in the Army National Guard, primary assigned aircraft changes for an Air National Guard O-2A aircraft unit in New York from a tactical mission to a strategic airlift (C-5 aircraft) mission, and the assignment of new attack and airlift helicopter battalions in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. In some cases, equipment requirements have increased and in others, they have decreased. Based on the amount of older equipment on-hand and the new requirements created by these structural changes, unit equipment fill rates may not be easily compared from year-to-year.

The Board recommends that all Reserve Component units when organized have equipment levels programmed to full wartime requirements. Further, it is the Board's position that at least enough equipment for training should be supplied immediately upon organization of a new unit.

## DOLLAR SHORTAGES

Because of the dynamics of force structuring and its direct impact on total Reserve Component equipment requirements, it is difficult to make comparisons from year-to-year on the value of equipment shortages. Dollar values of shortages discussed in previous years have varied from \$9 billion to \$24 billion. Although Congressional allocations have only made a "token dent" in the total equipment shortages, each appropriation, whether budgeted or added on, is appreciated and adds to the modernization of the forces. The shortfall for Reserve Component equipment at the end of FY 1985 was approximately \$15 billion but this figure does not reflect fully the total costs for replacing or modernizing obsolete, aging, substitute and nondeployable items currently in the inventory. Table 8 compares values of equipment required and on-hand for each of the Reserve Components and presents the overall shortfall. Table 9 further breaks down the information into major end items and other items to show that the shortfalls are not just in the "big ticket" items. The support base must be authorized and funded for each of the Reserve Components.

The Board urges Congress to continue the strong

**TABLE 8**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT DOLLAR VALUES—**  
**FY 1985 VERSUS FY 1984**  
**(EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND PERCENT)<sup>1</sup>**

	Total Equipment Items			Status(+/-)		
	Wartime Requirement	Currently Authorized	Currently On Hand	\$ Short On Hand vs Wartime Requirement	\$ Percent On Hand vs Wartime Requirement	\$ Percent On Hand vs Currently Authorized
<b>Army National Guard<sup>2</sup></b>						
FY 1985	\$ 30,555	\$ 28,964	\$ 19,615	\$ 10,940	64%	68%
FY 1984	\$ 24,711	\$ 22,175	\$ 15,081	\$ 8,630	61%	68%
Difference (+/-)	\$+ 5,844	\$+ 6,389	\$+ 4,534	\$+ 1,310		
Percent Change	+ 24%	+ 29%	+ 30%	+ 14%	+ 3%	+ 1%
<b>Army Reserve<sup>2</sup></b>						
FY 1985	\$ 6,685	\$ 6,486	\$ 4,655	\$ 2,030	70%	72%
FY 1984	\$ 6,677	\$ 4,651	\$ 3,442	\$ 3,235	52%	74%
Difference (+/-)	\$+ 8	\$+ 1,835	\$+ 1,213	\$- 1,205		
Percent Change	0%	+ 39%	+ 35%	- 37%	+ 18%	- 2%
<b>Naval Reserve<sup>3</sup></b>						
FY 1985	\$ 5,159	\$ 5,159	\$ 4,763	\$ 396	92%	92%
FY 1984	\$ 4,460	\$ 4,460	\$ 4,026	\$ 434	90%	90%
Difference (+/-)	\$+ 699	\$+ 699	\$+ 737	\$- 38		
Percent Change	+ 16%	+ 16%	+ 18%	- 9%	+ 2%	+ 2%
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>						
FY 1985	\$ 3,512	\$ 3,512	\$ 2,945	\$ 567	84%	84%
FY 1984	\$ 3,129	\$ 3,129	\$ 2,542	\$ 586	81%	81%
Difference (+/-)	\$+ 383	\$+ 383	\$+ 403	\$- 19		
Percent Change	+ 12%	+ 12%	+ 16%	- 3%	+ 3%	+ 3%
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
FY 1985	\$ 19,168	\$ 19,168	\$ 18,081	\$ 1,107	95%	95%
FY 1984	\$ 17,998	\$ 17,998	\$ 17,817 <sup>4</sup>	\$ 181 <sup>4</sup>	99% <sup>4</sup>	99% <sup>4</sup>
Difference (+/-)	\$+ 1,170	\$+ 1,170	\$+ 244	\$- 926		
Percent Change	+ 7%	+ 7%	+ 1%	- 512%	- 4%	- 4%
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
FY 1985	\$ 5,984	\$ 5,984	\$ 5,859	\$ 125	97%	97%
FY 1984	\$ 5,999	\$ 5,999	\$ 5,848	\$ 151	97%	97%
Difference (+/-)	\$- 15	\$- 15	\$+ 11	\$- 26		
Percent Change	0%	0%	0%	- 17%	0%	0%
<b>All DoD Services<sup>5</sup></b>						
FY 1985	\$ 71,063	\$ 68,873	\$ 55,898	\$ 15,165	79%	81%
FY 1984	\$ 62,688	\$ 58,126	\$ 48,757 <sup>4</sup>	\$ 13,931 <sup>4</sup>	74% <sup>4</sup>	80% <sup>4</sup>
Difference (+/-)	\$+ 8,375	\$+ 10,747	\$+ 7,141	\$+ 1,234		
Percent Change	+ 13%	+ 18%	+ 15%	+ 9%	+ 5%	+ 1%

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Figures rounded to nearest whole million and percent.

<sup>2</sup> Data presents asset picture as of May 30, 1985, and uses the TAEDP (Total Army Equipment Distribution Program) to project the asset picture as of September 30, 1985.

<sup>3</sup> 1984 data corrected for proper pricing, all figures in 1985 dollars.

<sup>4</sup> Figures used in 1984 Readiness Assessment have been updated to show current data.

<sup>5</sup> Figures show actual data as of September 30, 1985, for all components except ARNG and USAR which are projected figures for September 30, 1985, based on May 30, 1985, actual data.

Data as of September 30, 1985, except as noted.

**TABLE 9**  
**CHANGES IN RESERVE COMPONENT MAJOR ITEMS AND OTHER ITEMS**  
**(EXPRESSED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR AS A PERCENT)<sup>1</sup>**

		<b>Army<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>Navy<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	
<b>Major Items</b>		<b>Guard</b>	<b>Reserve</b>	<b>Reserve</b>		<b>Guard</b>	<b>Reserve</b>
Wartime Reqmt	FY85	\$ 29,074	\$ 6,405	\$ 4,303	\$ 3,379	\$ 14,983 <sup>4</sup>	\$ 5,334
Wartime Reqmt	FY84	\$ 23,323	\$ 6,321	\$ 3,600	\$ 3,018	\$ 15,013	\$ 5,388
Difference		\$+ 5,751	\$+ 84	\$+ 703	\$+ 361	\$- 30	\$- 54
Authorized	FY85	\$ 27,083	\$ 6,206	\$ 4,303	\$ 3,379	\$ 14,983	\$ 5,334
Authorized	FY84	\$ 20,840	\$ 4,392	\$ 3,600	\$ 3,018	\$ 15,013	\$ 5,388
Difference		\$+ 6,243	\$+ 1,814	\$+ 703	\$+ 361	\$- 30	\$- 54
On-Hand	FY85	\$ 18,833	\$ 4,388	\$ 4,303	\$ 2,831	\$ 14,976 <sup>5</sup>	\$ 5,334
On-Hand	FY84	\$ 14,340	\$ 3,236	\$ 3,600	\$ 2,450	\$ 15,800	\$ 5,352
Difference		\$+ 4,493	\$+ 1,152	\$+ 703	\$+ 381	\$- 824	\$- 18
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY85	65%	69%	100% <sup>6</sup>	84%	100% <sup>5</sup>	100%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY84	61%	51%	100%	81%	104%	99%
Difference		+ 4%	+ 18%	0%	+ 3%	- 4%	+ 1%
<b>Other Items<sup>7</sup></b>							
Authorized	FY85	\$ 1,481	\$ 280	\$ 868	\$ 133	\$ 4,185	\$ 650
Authorized	FY84	\$ 1,388	\$ 259	\$ 880	\$ 111	\$ 3,019	\$ 397
Difference		\$+ 93	\$+ 21	\$- 4	\$+ 22	\$+ 1,166	\$+ 253
On-Hand	FY85	\$ 782	\$ 257	\$ 480	\$ 114	\$ 3,065	\$ 525
On-Hand	FY84	\$ 583	\$ 208	\$ 426	\$ 92	\$ 2,680	\$ 307
Difference		\$+ 199	\$+ 51	\$+ 34	\$+ 22	\$+ 425	\$+ 218
% OH vs Authorized	FY85	53%	92%	54%	86%	74%	81%
% OH vs Authorized	FY84	42%	80%	50%	83%	68%	77%
Difference		+ 11%	+ 12%	+ 4%	+ 3%	- 14%	+ 4%

Code: WT = Wartime OH = On-Hand

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Figures rounded to nearest whole millions and percent.<sup>2</sup> Data presents asset picture as of May 30, 1985, and uses the TAEDP (Total Army Equipment Distribution Program) to project the asset picture as of September 30, 1985.<sup>3</sup> 1984 Data corrected for proper pricing: All figures in 1985 dollars.<sup>4</sup> Includes Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) and excludes backup aircraft.<sup>5</sup> 1984 data included all assigned aircraft. 1985 data includes only PAA. ANG is short two HH-3E helicopters. Reduction is a result of ongoing conversions to newer aircraft.<sup>6</sup> Some equipment requires replacement to ensure effectiveness and compatibility with active force units. Most of these items are addressed in the FYDP.<sup>7</sup> Includes items listed in previous RFPB reports such as: Support items, mobility equipment, Spares and Equipage.

Data as of September 30, 1985, except as noted.

support it has demonstrated in recent years for the Reserve Components. In the present era of budget reductions, the growth of an effective and economical Guard and Reserve Force should not be restricted by slowing the equipment flow to Reserve Component units. Only Congress, through its authorizations and appropriations, can reduce this approximately \$15 billion shortfall.

## EQUIPMENT SITUATION IN EACH RESERVE COMPONENT

### Army

Overall, the percent of fill of wartime requirements may seem marginally adequate but significant shortages remain in key areas such as wheeled vehicles and communications and elec-

tronics equipment. For example, the Army National Guard alone is short approximately 12,000 2½-ton and 5-ton trucks. Continuation of this shortage into wartime could significantly slow the tactical support of deployed forces. The Army does have acquisition plans to increase the inventory of wartime required items and other support equipment such as chemical defense materiel (for protection of individuals and equipment as well as for decontamination), field kitchens, bridging, and engineer equipment.

Many of the aircraft on-hand are substitute items which are nondeployable. Others may be carried in excess while awaiting modernization of the entire aircraft fleet. Ground support equipment for aviation units is short and must be provided to maintain current and projected aviation assets so they do not become a constraining factor in the deployment of aviation units. Reserve Components of the Army provide approximately 37 percent of the Total Army aviation force. With additional Guard and Reserve aviation units now programmed into the force structure, the percentage will increase significantly.

Certain equipment items affecting individual and equipment safety merit higher priority in the budget cycle. For example, the Board noted that the program for aviation survival vests for Army National Guard and Army Reserve pilots has been funded in the out-years. These should be given a higher priority because of the value of one trained pilot (and life itself) compared to the total dollars required for vests. Because the Reserve Components provide such a significant percentage of the aviation assets for the Total Army, the near-term provision of survival vests for pilot safety in combat and non-combat missions is important and would appear to be economical.

In FY 1985, the Army National Guard took possession of 180 new M1 Abrams tanks for two battalions in Mississippi and one battalion in Georgia. This brings the Guard's FY 1985 total to 240 tanks including the battalion in North Carolina already outfitted in FY 1983. The distribution of additional M1s to the Guard will continue in FY 1988 to one battalion each in Louisiana and South Carolina, and in FY 1989 to a battalion in Alabama. All of FY 1986's budgeted M1s will go into the Active Component although the Guard and Reserve will get M60A3s (the latest model of the M60 series tanks) beginning in FY 1986 and continuing into FY 1990. The Board is pleased with the Army's decision in 1985 to complete the modernization of its Reserve Components' tank fleet with M1 or M60A3 tanks by the end of FY 1990.

Equipment shortages are the most serious limiting factor affecting readiness in the Army Guard and Reserve. Wartime equipment requirements are at about 65 percent fill in the Army Guard and 50 percent fill in the Army Reserve. Peacetime fill authorizations are at approximately 69 percent and 60 percent in the Guard and Reserve respectively.

Excellent progress is being made by the Army in identifying critical mission and readiness needs in

units which are rated C-4. Once identified, steps are being taken to see that those units with equipment shortages get the equipment required to reach C-3 readiness status and that this equipment is not diverted in the distribution process to another unit or force with less critical shortages.

Shortages in "non-major equipment" such as night vision devices, communication gear, wheeled vehicles, and maintenance sets may seem to be minor, but they are usually significant. They are often tied to modernization and readiness of the Reserve Component forces in combat support and combat service support missions. These items may not have high-dollar value in the overall budget and the ease with which they are deleted from budget requests implies that they are inconsequential. The Board strongly recommends that "non-major equipment" items as requested in the DoD budget be retained in Congressional appropriations for the Army. They are vital to mission accomplishment by the Reserve Components.

The Army's Mission Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) program was initiated to solve equipment shortages that hinder realistic training, particularly in later-deploying or lower priority units. The reduction of MEET shortages will significantly enhance unit training programs (and thus unit morale) and will help sustain the mobilization and training base for the Army. Some units began receiving MEET equipment in FY 1985. The remaining units should receive equipment during FY 1986 as it becomes available from procurement, maintenance, or redistribution of displaced equipment. Guard and Reserve commanders have been tasked to identify the ten additional most important items needed for training by their unit in the future. This information will provide a basis for identification of MEET items in coming years.

## Navy

The Navy's policy for equipment acquisition is "horizontal integration." Under this policy, the Naval Reserve will modernize simultaneously with the Active Component. This facilitates force integration and ensures compatibility of equipment between the components. Evidence of policy implementation is the modernization program for Reserve carrier air wings which includes the introduction of E-2Cs, F-14s, F/A-18s, and A-7Es into the Naval Air Reserve. Additionally, LAMPS helicopters have been transferred into the Naval Air Reserve. Ships to augment the amphibious warfare, oiler, and mine countermeasures fleets are also programmed for the Naval Reserve.

The Naval Reserve has 100 percent of its aircraft on-hand but only has about half of its other equipment. In order to sustain its Reserve Component forces in wartime, increased priority needs to be given to the purchase of spares. At present only 47 percent of the value of spares required to sustain operations of the Reserve Carrier Air Wings aboard active force aircraft carriers is on-hand. This is up

from 40 percent last year and 29 percent in FY 1983. This trend will continue as Reserve Air Wings' modernization progresses. Other support equipment and advanced base equipment on-hand are only 50 percent and 57 percent respectively of the total value of the requirements.

The Navy began in 1985 to procure Craft of Opportunity (COOP) for the Reserve augmentation of mine countermeasure ships. They will also assist in charting harbor routes and participate in wartime harbor clearances. COOP vessels will consist of ten patrol craft already in the inventory and twelve modified commercial vessels which become available to the Naval Reserve under various government programs. These craft must be provided with packages of appropriate equipment to make them useful as military vessels.

Several Naval Reserve Construction Force and Cargo Handling Battalions have been or are soon to be added to the force structure but remain without or significantly short of equipment. These units cannot be effectively put into war plans because they cannot accomplish missions in their present status. The Board recommends a higher priority be given to the equipping of these battalions.

### Marine Corps

The Marine Corps' policy for determining equipment requirements for all units, both active and reserve, is accomplished through a single acquisition objective. The policy for fielding this equipment is similar to the Navy's policy of "horizontal integration." Although this policy is being carried out in the Marine Corps Reserve ground forces, this is not true for the air arm of the Marine Corps Reserve, which is Navy funded. The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing will continue to operate its current fleet into the 1990s. Some of the aircraft will remain in the Reserve Component inventory up to eight years after the last of these same aircraft are removed from the Active Component. Another example is the CH-53E helicopter which is now in the Active Marine Component. It is the only helicopter capable of lifting the 155mm Howitzer M198. The Marine Corps Reserve 4th Marine Division is currently receiving this new howitzer but the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing which supports the 4th Marine Division is not scheduled to transition to the CH-53E until FY 1998. Thus, the Marine Corps Reserve does not have means to organically lift some of its own equipment. The Board recommends that the "horizontal integration" policy be applied equitably among all Marine Corps assets to ensure effective Reserve Component augmentation and reinforcement of the Active Component when mobilized.

The Marine Corps Reserve attained 100% of its tank requirement and 99% of its air support radar/IFF equipment even though these requirements were raised for FY 1985. It also has 100% of its air command/control equipment. The requirements in this area were lowered during this year, but it must be noted that this was not a serious shortfall

previously. Significant shortages continue in spares and other equipment such as radios, ground support radars, trucks, missile systems, engineer equipment, materiel handling equipment, generators and amphibious assault vehicles. These shortages, however, will essentially be eliminated by the end of FY 1988 if current programs remain intact. The Marine Corps Reserve is short only 17 aircraft but will require \$284 million to fund their purchase. This funding amounts to almost half of the total cost of eliminating all equipment needs in the Marine Corps Reserve.

### Air Force

As mentioned earlier, aircraft aging continues to be a major issue in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. Some aircraft are rapidly approaching obsolescence. These components are concentrating efforts to modernize and upgrade existing equipment including engines, communications, weaponry, electronic countermeasures capability, and support equipment. As part of the modernization program C-5s and C-141s were first introduced into the Air Reserve Forces in 1985. In some programming actions, missions have been changed resulting in the issuance of the newer aircraft. The allocation of these and other newer airlift and fighter/attack aircraft will continue into the foreseeable future.

Trucks and communications equipment continue as major shortages in the Air Force Reserve. In FY 1985, only 61 percent of the dollar value of truck requirements was on-hand. It would take approximately \$36 million to "fix" this shortage category. The majority of this amount would be for replacement vehicles, not to meet increased requirements. Value of communications equipment is 53 percent of requirements.

The requirements for communications equipment in the Air National Guard are greater since the Air National Guard has a larger percentage of the combat communications missions than does the Air Force Reserve. In this category, the Air National Guard is fully equipped. However, much of the equipment is vacuum tube technology which is being replaced as rapidly as possible through close Air National Guard and Air Force coordination.

Mobility (support) equipment is at 79 and 90 percent of wartime requirement for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve respectively. This category includes much of the aircraft ground service equipment and personal equipment required to support deploying aviation units. Shortages are on order or programmed.

### Coast Guard

Selected Reserve personnel of the Coast Guard are programmed for wartime augmentation of existing command structures. The Coast Guard does not currently have any prepositioned war reserve, except for POL and small arms. Thus, equipment for mobil-

ized reserve personnel would have to be procured from available commercial or government sources.

A major effort is now underway to identify the equipment and logistics support required following mobilization, including input to the Industrial Preparedness Plan (IPP). As of now, the most critical equipment shortfalls include harbor and port security boats; secure communications equipment for boats, aircraft and shoreside command centers; vehicles; uniforms; and dedicated berthing, messing, and office space to accommodate mobilized reservists. These items are all under consideration for either war reserve stocks or an IPP requirement.

## OTHER ISSUES

The Board has adopted formal positions on other equipment-related issues. Two issues of continued interest to the Board are briefly summarized below.

- **Chemical Warfare.** The Board reemphasizes its earlier position that there is insufficient chemical warfare capability, both offensive and defensive, in the U.S. Armed Forces. Our capability has been allowed to deteriorate, while Warsaw Pact forces have maintained chemical warfare equipping and training as a higher priority. The Board believes that U.S. Armed Forces need more first line chemical equipment and weapons to meet the chemical warfare threat facing this nation.
- **Forward Air Controllers.** Lacking proper aircraft and other equipment, no Forward Air Controller support is available for many Reserve Component ground combat units upon deployment. This deficiency severely affects their war fighting capability.

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board notes that in recent years, equipment requirements have been increasing as more missions are assigned to the Reserve Components. Although requirements continue to increase, in general, new and redistributed equipment has been provided to the Reserve Components at a faster pace, resulting in decreased shortfalls.


Significant improvement in the modernization of the Reserve Components has also been achieved recently. Major end-items such as newer tanks and aircraft have entered their inventories. On the horizon, however, the Board has noted Congressional interest in slowing the overall Defense buildup through budget reductions and is concerned that this apparent trend will have an adverse impact on Reserve Component modernization programs. Budget analysts warn the Board that the effects of budgetary constraints will be felt in a sharp reduction of equipment allocations to the Reserve Components in about two years. Under these circumstances, unless there is a special effort to protect the continuing implementation of the "first to fight,

first to be equipped" policy, the war-fighting and war-supporting capabilities of a changing Guard and Reserve will be severely limited.

With adequate, modern resources, the Reserve Components can do the job required of them. Shortages of deployable equipment, equipment incompatibility, the lack of modern training equipment, and insufficient ammunition and spare parts for Reserve Component equipment are all major inhibiting factors to a more effective Guard and Reserve. Passive attitudes within some elements of the Active Components, DoD, and Congress toward Reserve Component equipment status need to be ended. Equipment shortfalls, amounting to approximately \$15 billion must be reduced and eliminated through aggressive DoD planning and Congressional appropriations to help bring the Reserve Components up to acceptable equipment standards. Although this report does not address Active Component equipment shortfalls, the Board recognizes that many equipment needs are similar in both the Active and Reserve Components.

The Board recommends:

- ...that equipment continue to be issued on the basis of "first to fight, first to be equipped" rather than on an evaluation of a unit's performance or readiness.
- ...that non-deployable and substitute equipment be accurately identified to determine the extent of equipment problems.
- ...that all Reserve Component units have equipment levels programmed to full wartime requirements.
- ...that at least enough equipment on-hand for training be provided immediately upon organization of any new unit.
- ...that "non-major equipment" items as requested in the DoD budget be retained in Congressional appropriations for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
- ...that a higher priority be given for equipping the several Naval Reserve Construction and Cargo Handling Battalions currently in or being added to the force structure.
- ...that the Navy's "horizontal integration" equipment distribution policy be applied equitably among all Marine Corps assets to ensure effective Marine Corps Reserve augmentation and reinforcement of the Active Component upon mobilization.
- ...that chemical warfare equipment and weapons be upgraded to meet the threat.
- ...that Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft and other equipment be procured so units can be organized and FAC support provided to Reserve Component combat units when deployed.
- ...that Congress continue its strong support demonstrated in recent years for the Reserve Components. Only Congress, through its authorizations and appropriations, can reduce the multi-billion dollar equipment shortfall.



## Chapter VI

# FACILITIES

### GENERAL

The Board is pleased with the effort made during the last year to construct, replace and upgrade National Guard and Reserve facilities identified with the administration, logistics support, and training of the Reserve Components. The increasing inventory of equipment, increased manning in both old and newly organized units, facility age and associated maintenance costs, storage requirements, and space for training require continuing analyses of the adequacy of available facilities. The quality of facilities, their appearance and overall condition influence morale, recruitment, and retention of Guard and Reserve personnel. Thus adequate, well-maintained working and training areas can also affect the readiness of a unit. Based on field observations of Active and Reserve Component facilities, both within the United States and on European trips, the Board feels that new major construction as well as minor construction and repair is necessary and must be prioritized based on the contribution of the facility to the readiness of the units being supported.

### CONSTRUCTION PLANNING

The limited availability of military construction funds from federal or state appropriations requires careful review of the economies of construction or repair of current properties and of the leasing/purchasing of available civilian assets. In so doing however, it will be important to ensure that training is not degraded and that equipment remains immediately available for training.

Before submitting construction programs for funding, the Services must develop sound, executable programs which include projects that will have complete designs and be ready for contract early in the fiscal year. The Services did better in execution of military construction programs during FY 1985 than in past years, but the goal of 100 percent first-year budget execution has not yet been met in all the Reserve Components.

The Board is pleased to note that DoD has re-

moved from the DoD Construction Manual much of the detailed planning, programming, and design criteria for Reserve Component facilities. Projects will be tailored now by each Reserve Component based on functional criteria. This should result in increased facility efficiency and economic use by each Service component.

### EXPANDED REQUIREMENTS

National Guard and Reserve armories, centers and other training areas were not originally designed or built to provide space for storage and use of training simulators and devices. The wide variety of these simulators and devices (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES), shipboard simulators, aviation simulators, gunnery training devices, and developing technology video disc trainers) have been and should increasingly become the means of improving and sustaining skills and readiness of Reserve Component personnel and units. Detailed planning for modifying or constructing facilities to accommodate these training devices and simulators must be accomplished now, even for equipment not to be available until the next decade.

Several indoor firing ranges in armories and centers do not meet safety standards and need renovation. Although the practicality of indoor ranges is limited by types of weapons that can be fired, by numbers of available firing points, and by environmental/community concerns, these ranges are critical to developing and sustaining individual marksmanship skills, especially in areas with harsh climates. Presently, some units must use valuable training time to travel to distant locations because of the unsuitability of their own ranges. If local facilities are not available for safe firing or maneuvering, construction should be considered for tent pads, kitchen facilities, and sanitary facilities to accommodate overnight bivouacking of units at ranges and training areas where the forces can safely train. This would have a positive impact on training efficiency and morale of troops who must train in the field on weekends. The Board recom-



mends that units conduct more coordination with other Services in their general area to identify training and range facilities which can be shared to avoid waste in underutilized facilities, construction duplication or available training time before looking for distant training sites or programming construction.

## TRAINING LANDS AND AIR SPACES

Requirements for training land and air space have increased along with advances in military technology. Concurrently, the influence of population growth, resource conservation, and social considerations has constrained the use of those facilities currently available.

Modern weapons systems have changed the tempo, lethality, dispersion and speed of battle. Parcels of land, once adequate for large-scale division maneuvers, are today barely sufficient for forces one-third that size. During the 1980's, technological advancements brought more modern air and ground equipment into the Guard and Reserve inventories, thereby requiring larger areas and air space in which to train. In addition, advances in communications and target acquisition on the modern battlefield require the use of jamming and anti-jamming devices during training, which may affect nearby aviation and radio facilities.

In the air, commercial and private aircraft patterns have reduced air space available to military aviators. Further, military aircraft conducting maneuvers or live ordnance bombing strikes are often so channelized in reaching a target area that little tactical training for the aircrew is achieved.

On the coastline, environmental and seasonal restrictions often preclude tactical amphibious operations. Endangered species, shore life, and plant life sometimes make it necessary for military guides to direct each combat vehicle from the water line to designated trails leading inland. Again, tactical training is limited as a result of the necessity for administrative marshalling and control of assault forces.

On land, tracked and wheeled vehicles are often restricted to movements on established trails and roadways. Tactical realism and realistic deployment of troops is often limited by wildlife habitats; restrictions on digging fortifications and barrier construction; predesignated field positions; required portable toilets; and area policing. Realistic training, so vital to success on the modern battlefield, has become difficult to achieve. The military can anticipate little relief, since trends indicate even greater limitations in the future.

Environmental issues (e.g. noise abatement) are of joint military and civilian concern during both day and night training. The encroachment of civilian housing, industry, and business into earlier unofficial buffer zones is a matter of safety and environmental interest and has, in some cases, strained relationships between the civilian and military communities.

Many Active and Reserve Component military facilities, which were adequate in the first half of

the century, restrict effective military training today. At a time when forthcoming aviation and ground weapons systems require greater training space, less space will actually be available. Because of the facility restrictions, new weapons, such as the M1 tank and rocket-assisted artillery projectiles, can never be used to their maximum capabilities. Thus, crewmen are prevented from developing and refining required skills, and could be called upon to enter a future battlefield without requisite experience and confidence in the full power and capabilities at their disposal.

## ACCOMMODATING FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL

To assist in increasing the readiness of the Reserve Components, Congress and the Services have provided more full-time support personnel in units at all levels. These personnel now occupy office space formerly available to the units. All of the Reserve Components have 100 percent federal funding of their facilities except the Army National Guard which must squeeze full-time personnel into existing space and use state funds to operate and maintain the space. The Board recommends that federal Operations and Maintenance funds be authorized and appropriated for increased costs directly attributable to full-time support office space requirements in the Army National Guard. FY 1986 legislation addressing this issue was actively being considered by Congress as this report was going to press.

## SERVICE ACTIVITIES

### Army

After reviewing the adequacy of its mobilization facilities, the Army requested \$5.1 million in the FY 1985 budget for planning and designing mobilization facilities. Although the Army request was not funded by Congress for the fiscal year, the Board urges the Army (and the Navy and Air Force) to continue to give high priority and provide strong justification for mobilization programs to ensure that funds are requested, authorized, and appropriated for these facilities in future years. Each of the Services should consider mobilization needs prior to submitting any construction requests so that a determination can be made whether the proposed facility can satisfy mobilization as well as peacetime requirements.

### Navy

The Naval Reserve operates the Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP) as a wartime harbor patrol and security function. COOP vessels are to be homeported in 22 U.S. locations. COOP units will generally be assigned to commercial ports which do not contain Naval bases. Attempts are underway to collocate these units with Coast Guard units to make maximum use of existing facilities.

Maintenance and repair of real property at Naval Reserve activities has been limited to the most critical items because of funding restrictions. During FY 1985, the Naval Reserve embarked on a total



center repair program where major repair and modernization of entire complexes are performed. This program, with proper application of selected repair projects and establishment of an adequate funding base to satisfy recurring maintenance costs will provide an environment suitable for performing the operational and training missions assigned to the activity.

#### **Air Force**

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are increasingly facing problems caused by encroachment of developers adjacent to air facilities. Noise abatement problems are often associated with such encroachment. These and related environmental issues must be continually addressed to maintain positive community relationships while achieving training goals.

### **OVERSEAS ISSUES**

In many parts of NATO, especially the Southern flank, necessary Collocated Operating Base (COB) improvements have not been made or programmed. Tactical squadrons of both Active and Reserve Components are scheduled to deploy to COBs that have not been built. This program needs a higher fiscal priority with construction completed through the NATO Infrastructure Budget, or the planned employment of squadrons should be redirected to areas where they can be supported. The Board also noted serious infrastructure and facilities shortfalls that affect abilities to receive and deploy reinforcements in the theater. The implementation of host nation support agreements with some nations should be expedited and higher priorities assigned to needed construction.

During the Board's 1985 visit to the Southern flank of NATO and Israel, the members were given a demonstration in Israel of an equipment "Dry Clad" storage system. Major items of equipment, which are combat ready and loaded (except for certain unstable materials) are placed inside environmentally-controlled "cocoons" and can be kept that way for years. The Board recommends that U.S. requirements be reviewed to see if the Israeli system, which permits wider dispersion and flexibility than the U.S. system, has value for our purposes.

One issue raised to the Board while in Europe was the movement within the theater, during wartime, of consumables such as fuel and ammunition. The Army Guard and Reserve will provide a significant percentage of the transportation of fuel. The requirements for overland wheeled transportation of bulk fuels may be reduced through an enhanced pipeline distribution system. It is recognized that pipelines are never so secure that the need for alternate transportation can be completely discounted. Nonetheless, the Board recommends that DoD and NATO planners continue to analyze security requirements and the economies of funding more pipeline construction to handle bulk fuels in relation to the expense of mobilizing Reserve Component assets to transport equal amounts of fuel.

### **SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Additional Guard and Reserve missions, a larger force structure, new and more equipment, and increased training and storage requirements, all impact on facilities needed. These requirements demand that greater attention be given to facility needs within each of the Reserve Components, their parent Services, OSD, and Congress. Adequacy of facilities directly affects the readiness of units.

Although military construction program budget execution has increased and, in fact, reached its highest rate in FY 1985, the Reserve Components must continually strive for 100 percent first-year budget execution. Guidelines which were published during the year should enhance the possibilities of reaching that goal within the next few program years.

Environmental restrictions have reduced training space in some communities. Additionally, the need for larger facilities and training areas, generated by modern weapon systems with greater capabilities, have caused the Services to review economies of training, e.g., costs for fuel for travel to distant sites vs. costs for enhancing local training through simulation and training devices. Space and facilities management for training and administration in existing or proposed projects must be critically analyzed for full integration of requirements within a Service or even between the joint Services.

Overseas basing requirements are not under the purview of the Reserve Components. However, the Board is concerned that many Collocated Operating Bases in Europe are not ready to receive Reserve Component units programmed to deploy to those sites.

The Board recommends:

- ...that major commands conduct more coordination with other Services in their general geographic area to identify training and range facilities which can be shared to avoid waste and construction duplication, and save training time.
- ...that federal Operations and Maintenance funds be authorized and appropriated for increased costs directly attributable to full-time support office space requirements in the Army National Guard.
- ...that the status of Collocated Operating Bases in NATO be reviewed to ensure they are ready to receive and support Reserve Component air squadrons scheduled to arrive upon mobilization. If not ready to receive the squadrons, construction should be completed using NATO infrastructure funds, or in the alternative, the squadrons should be scheduled for deployment elsewhere.
- ...that the security requirements and economies of funding more bulk fuel pipelines in NATO be compared with requirements for mobilizing Reserve Component assets to transport equal amounts of fuel.



## Chapter VII

# BUDGET ISSUES

### ACTIVE COMPONENT BUDGET

The Department of Defense, with the support of the Congress, has made progress in correcting the cumulative effect of neglect during the seventies.

Table 10 displays selected budget areas for the Active Components. The increases in procurement accounts, more than doubled in some cases, are doing much to modernize the force, both Active and Reserve.

**TABLE 10**  
**ACTIVE COMPONENT**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Army</b>						
Mil Personnel	12,148,300	14,024,000	14,620,848	15,388,833	21,724,784	22,712,000
O&M	13,013,933	15,043,101	15,841,484	17,326,026	18,603,608	20,190,630
Procurement	10,521,748	13,975,283	16,035,076	17,424,279	19,376,450	21,366,100
RDT&E	3,127,774	3,609,535	3,875,283	4,202,175	4,376,115	5,279,900
Mil Construction	889,434	950,701	929,720	1,184,140	1,583,137	2,020,900
<b>Navy</b>						
Mil Personnel	8,920,295	10,324,774	10,846,708	11,445,906	16,164,107	17,221,400
O&M	17,742,999	19,728,489	21,070,587	22,265,626	25,334,741	25,797,700
Procurement	19,769,593	26,461,777	33,429,427	29,737,578	32,219,949	35,703,300
RDT&E <sup>2</sup>	4,906,969	5,827,726	6,093,631	7,586,318	9,274,106	11,264,300
Mil Construction <sup>2</sup>	794,265	1,451,393	1,060,750	1,231,517	1,534,592	2,065,200
<b>Marine Corps</b>						
Mil Personnel	2,688,500	3,120,745	3,347,977	3,520,369	4,967,143	5,217,400
O&M	1,072,206	1,200,040	1,483,471	1,547,720	1,650,894	1,667,400
Procurement	506,013	1,709,456	1,960,383	1,741,306	1,836,722	1,726,800
<b>Air Force</b>						
Mil Personnel	10,001,821	11,477,572	12,217,050	12,842,363	18,142,718	19,187,900
O&M	14,756,374	16,135,519	17,057,126	17,770,345	19,213,465	20,924,400
Procurement	16,906,592	23,747,281	27,981,650	36,091,985	41,814,538	46,566,200
RDT&E	7,133,347	8,872,068	10,621,181	12,257,706	13,508,347	15,578,500
Mil Construction	937,225	1,558,451	1,551,414	1,459,993	1,572,655	2,082,000
<b>Coast Guard</b>						
Mil Personnel	609,915	706,776	692,695	774,981	797,024	786,281
O&M	736,441	789,699	927,720	929,364	970,608	987,692

Notes: <sup>1</sup> FY 1986 figures are from the President's Budget Request.

<sup>2</sup> RDT&E and Military Construction funding for both the Navy and Marine Corps are listed under Navy.

Sources: Annual Financial Summary Tables, DoD Budgets for Fiscal Years 1981-1985 (OASD, Comptroller). All Coast Guard data are from the Office of Readiness and Reserve, U.S. Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

**RESERVE COMPONENT BUDGET**

The Chief of each Reserve Component and the Honorable James H. Webb, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), have also devoted considerable and direct personal attention to resources for Reserve Components during the budget cycles. As one of many such examples, Secretary Webb recently stated during hearings before the Subcommittee on Defense, of the Senate

Committee on Appropriations:

"...it is essential that sufficient funding be made available to man, equip, and train the Guard and Reserve forces to ensure that they can be integrated into the total military structure as fully functional units or as trained individuals, and as equal partners."

The increases in support of the Reserve Components are reflected in Table 11.

**TABLE 11**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY**  
**(THOUSANDS)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Army National Guard</b>						
Mil Personnel	1,175,600	1,512,900	1,677,000	1,882,960	2,908,734	3,430,800
O&M	951,370	1,109,897	1,195,067	1,118,390	1,439,293	1,805,200
Mil Construction	42,289	67,658	54,958	67,620	98,603	102,100
<b>Army Reserve</b>						
Mil Personnel	670,500	1,081,000	1,228,250	1,361,150	2,080,993	2,394,400
O&M	521,593	686,661	705,584	692,390	732,700	779,600
Mil Construction	43,200	64,703	41,800	54,700	66,306	70,700
<b>Naval Reserve</b>						
Mil Personnel	318,758	374,800	678,425	767,100	1,158,087	1,353,600
O&M	554,172	574,367	629,407	638,590	828,781	954,500
Mil Construction <sup>2</sup>	33,000	36,000	25,200	30,605	60,800	51,600
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>						
Mil Personnel	120,357	152,500	170,960	176,200	271,801	290,000
O&M	28,854	40,444	51,094	52,349	58,842	61,600
Mil Construction <sup>3</sup>	(27%)	(23%)	(47%)	(36%)	(17%)	(23%)
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
Mil Personnel	387,209	479,900	536,425	569,100	892,281	995,100
O&M	1,530,907	1,671,218	1,822,603	1,807,650	1,828,848	1,830,100
Mil Construction	89,700	105,140	127,900	108,888	111,200	137,200
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
Mil Personnel	277,360	327,250	362,125	368,750	562,860	622,500
O&M	601,980	679,254	766,735	791,150	861,261	907,700
Mil Construction	21,600	37,400	35,600	41,200	67,800	66,800
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>						
Mil Personnel	37,527	39,909	41,687	44,241	48,300	49,432
O&M	11,730	11,775	12,021	10,871	12,001	11,968

Notes: <sup>1</sup>FY 1986 figures are from the President's Budget Request.

<sup>2</sup>Military Construction funding for both the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve are listed under Naval Reserve.

<sup>3</sup>Marine Corps percent of Total Marine Corps/Naval Reserve Budget for construction.

Sources: Annual Financial Summary Tables, DoD Budgets for Fiscal Years 1981-1985 (OASD, Comptroller). All Coast Guard data are from the Office of Readiness and Reserve, U.S. Coast Guard.

**TABLE 12**  
**END STRENGTH GROWTH**  
**ACTIVE COMPONENTS AND SELECTED RESERVE**

	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	% Change FY 81-85
US Army	751,842	780,391	778,843	780,180	780,787	- 0.0
Army National Guard	389,009	407,001	417,178	434,239	438,952	+ 13.1
Army Reserve	232,031	256,959	288,188	275,062	292,080	+ 25.9
US Navy	529,459	541,729	557,573	584,838	570,705	+ 7.8
Naval Reserve	98,297	104,757	109,094	120,558	129,832	+ 32.1
US Marine Corps	190,820	192,380	194,089	198,214	198,025	+ 3.9
Marine Corps Reserve	37,304	40,481	42,890	40,619	41,586	+ 11.5
US Air Force	570,302	582,845	582,044	597,125	601,515	+ 5.5
Air National Guard	98,283	109,857	102,170	105,012	109,398	+ 11.3
Air Force Reserve	62,255	64,443	67,227	70,318	75,214	+ 20.8
US Coast Guard	39,760	38,248	39,708	38,705	38,595	- 2.9
Coast Guard Reserve	11,884	11,848	12,156	12,357	12,580	+ 5.9

**Note:** Guard and Reserve members on active duty or full-time National Guard duty in support of the Reserve Components are included in the Selected Reserve strengths for all years. In the case of the Navy, FY 1983 was the first year that TAR personnel were included in the Navy's Selected Reserve authorization rather than as part of the Navy's active duty end strength. In this table, however, TARs are removed from the Active Navy and included with the Naval Reserve for all years to provide a consistent comparison for all components.

**Source:** DoD Active Component Data—OASD (FM&P)  
 DoD Reserve Component Data—OASD (RA)  
 Coast Guard Data—Coast Guard (R&P)

Data as of September 30, 1985.

## MANNING LEVELS IN THE TOTAL FORCE

The transfer of missions and increased reliance on the Reserve Components is reflected in higher strength authorizations. Table 12 shows strengths attained by both the Active and Reserve Components, with the Reserve Components growing considerably more than the Active Component.

Making use of the statistical data on budget appropriations provided in Tables 10 and 11, as well as the personnel strengths shown in Table 12, a comparison of O&M funding and manning levels was prepared.

## COMPARISON OF O&M FUNDING WITH MANNING LEVELS

Shortages and obsolescence of equipment in the Reserve Components are discussed elsewhere in this report. In addition to those extensive shortfalls, the Board is also concerned about levels of funding for Operations and Maintenance (O&M).

Appropriations for O&M provide for on-going activities of a component. Included are the pay of civilian personnel, operation and maintenance of

aircraft, vessels, equipment and bases, training expenses, direct care medical programs, and a host of other activities. There can be no direct correlation drawn between personnel strength trends (manpower determinants) and O&M resourcing. Nonetheless, strength levels do serve as an indicator, and facilitate correlation analysis of many factors and activities that draw from the O&M account. Table 13 highlights some of the trends of interest to the Board.

When increases in O&M are compared with increases in personnel, questions are raised regarding whether the Reserve Components have been appropriated adequate O&M funds to support the growth in missions, organizational structure, and personnel.

Fiscal constraints often push more missions from the Active Components to the Reserve Components. In addition, there is the well-recognized temptation in DoD and Congress to direct across-the-board cuts when tough budgetary decisions must be made. Some recent trends have been heartening, but the Board is concerned that decision makers continue to recognize that O&M funding has far from caught up with the increased missions and structure in the Reserve Components.

**TABLE 13**  
**INCREASES IN FY 81-85**  
**OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) APPROPRIATIONS**  
**(COMPARED TO PERSONNEL STRENGTH CHANGES)**

	<b>Personnel Increases</b>	<b>O&amp;M Increases</b>	<b>Difference Pers vs O&amp;M</b>	<b>Delta</b>
<b>Army</b>				
Active Component	(None)	43.0%	+ 43.0	13.4 (AC)
Reserve Components	17.9%	47.5%	+ 29.6	
<b>Navy</b>				
Active Component	7.8%	42.8%	+ 35.0	17.5 (AC)
Reserve Component	32.1%	49.6%	+ 17.5	
<b>Marine Corps</b>				
Active Component	3.9%	54.0%	+ 50.1	41.1 (RC)
Reserve Component	12.7%	103.9%	+ 91.2	
<b>Air Force</b>				
Active Component	5.5%	30.2%	+ 24.7	12.6 (AC)
Reserve Components	15.0%	27.1%	+ 12.1	
<b>Coast Guard</b>				
Active Component	- 2.9%	31.8%	+ 34.7	38.3 (AC)
Reserve Component	5.9%	2.3%	- 3.6	

#### **NEED FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL DoD BUDGET**

It should be emphasized that the Board strongly supports increasing the overall level of defense spending, involving both Active and Reserve Components.

As shown in Table 14, the percentage of funding directed to national defense has greatly decreased over the years. Too often it seems that budget considerations play a larger role in determining the level of support for our armed forces than the threat to our security and survival or to the crucial commitments we have made to our allies around the world.

**TABLE 14**  
**THE DEFENSE BUDGET**

	<b>DoD Share of the GNP</b>	<b>DoD Share of the Federal Budget</b>
1955	9.2%	51.3%
1960	8.3%	45.0%
1965	7.0%	38.7%
1970	8.0%	39.4%
1975	5.7%	25.5%
1980	5.2%	22.5%
1985	6.8%	25.7%

Source: National Defense Budget Estimates  
for FY 1986, OASD(C), March 1985.  
Data as of September 30, 1985.

#### **CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT**

The Board is pleased with the support heretofore provided to Reserve Components by Congress. Congress has made appropriations directed at modernizing the Reserve Components. In FY 1985 alone, Congress added \$931,383,000 in addition to those funds requested by DoD. Those funds were specifically directed for support of various programs in the Reserve Components.

#### **SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Budgetary support and the influx of new equipment have greatly improved the readiness and capability of our Reserve Components. Yet, much remains to be done. As this report goes to press, it is clear that DoD will again face inadequate funding similar to the conditions that existed before recent support bolstered our readiness posture. Moreover, O&M funding in the Reserve Components even now does not appear to have kept pace with increased manpower, equipment, and mission assignments. The Board is therefore deeply distressed that future

budgets for Reserve Components could face blanket or across-the-board cuts. Limited resources must be judiciously allocated among the Total Force partners. The Board hopes that this principle will be maintained in the coming year.

The Board recommends:

- ...that Operations and Maintenance funding

in the Reserve Components be increased commensurate with increased personnel, equipment, and mission growth.

- ...that growth in the overall level of defense spending be continued, for both Active and Reserve Components.

“

“It may be laid down as . . . the basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it. . . .”

*George Washington*

”

“

“The Reservist is twice the citizen.”

*Winston Churchill*

”

## Appendix A

# Definition of Terms

The following translation of acronyms and definitions apply in this report:

**ADT** — Active Duty for Training. A tour of active duty to provide training for members of the Reserve Components. The tour of duty is under orders which provide both a specified beginning date and the number of days for training to be performed.

**AGR** — Active Guard and Reserve. Guard or Reserve members of a unit in the Selected Reserve who are ordered to active duty or full-time National Guard duty with their consent for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components. All unit AGR members must be in a mobilization position.

**AT** — Annual Training. The annual training period for Reserve Components, normally about two weeks in duration.

**COMMISSIONED UNITS** — Units of the Navy with organic equipment such as ships, aircraft squadrons or construction battalions which are tasked to deliver a complete operational entity to the operating force.

**DOPMA** — Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. A legislative act applicable to Active Component personnel. The proposed Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) when enacted will be the Reserve Component equivalent.

**FORSTAT** — Force Status and Identity Report. See Chapter II for a description.

**FTTD** — Full-Time Training Duty — on a voluntary basis, in active service.

**IADT** — Initial Active Duty for Training. First period of active duty for initial individual training prescribed by law or regulation.

**IDT** — Inactive Duty Training. Authorized training performed by a reservist not on active duty or active duty for training.

**IMA** — Individual Mobilization Augmentee. Individual members of the Selected Reserve, trained and preassigned to a wartime required manpower billet which must be filled on or shortly after mobilization.

**ING** — Inactive National Guard. National Guard personnel in a temporary inactive status (and in the Ready Reserve) but not in the Selected Reserve.

They are attached to a specific National Guard unit, and do not participate in training activities even though they will mobilize with the unit.

**IRR** — Individual Ready Reserve. Ready Reservists who are neither on active duty nor in the Selected Reserve.

**JCS** — Joint Chiefs of Staff

**MEET** — Mission Essential Equipment for Training. The minimum quantity of equipment required by a unit to accomplish its training (as compared with wartime) mission.

**MILES** — Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System. A training device system that adds realism to training exercises by permitting users to "shoot" opponents with eye-safe lasers.

**MT** — Military Technician. Federal civilian employee assigned to a unit in the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserve for administration, training, or maintenance in the day-to-day support of the Guard and Reserve.

**NCA** — National Command Authority

**OSD** — Office of the Secretary of Defense

**PIM** — Pretrained Individual Manpower. IRR, ING, Standby Reserve, and Regular and Reserve Retired members available in the event of full mobilization.

**POMCUS** — Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets. Equipment that has been prepositioned in Europe to permit units to deploy in wartime without their heavy equipment.

**READY RESERVE** — Members organized in units, or as individuals, both of which are liable for call to active duty to augment the Active forces in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve is composed of the Selected Reserve, IRR and ING.

**REINFORCING UNITS** — (Navy/Marine/Coast Guard) Units which augment active commissioned units and operating staffs with trained personnel to permit operations at the highest level of readiness for an indefinite period of time.

**RETIRED RESERVE** — Former members who have been transferred to retired status on the basis of their active and/or reserve service.

**RFPB** — Reserve Forces Policy Board

**ROPA** — Reserve Officer Personnel Act. The current but obsolescent statute governing officer personnel actions in the Reserve Components. To be replaced with ROPMA.

**ROPMA** — Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, now in draft form. The Reserve Component equivalent of DOPMA.

**RPA** — Reserve Program Administrator (Coast Guard). Members on active duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Component.

**SELECTED RESERVE** — Units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by JCS as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserve categories.

**SRIP** — Selected Reserve Incentive Program. A package of incentives to assist recruiting and retention in the Selected Reserve.

**STANDBY RESERVE** — Personnel who maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve, who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship or disability. Not required to perform training and could be mobilized if necessary.

**SUSTAINING UNITS** — (Navy/Coast Guard) Units which augment fleet and force support activities with trained personnel necessary to provide surge capability and to sustain the high level of activity required to support the deployed forces adequately.

**TAR** — Training and Administration of Reserves. Naval Reserve members on active duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Component.

**UNITREP** — Unit Status and Identity Report. A complete description is found in Chapter II.



## Appendix B

# Reserve Component Contributions to the Total Force

Each component of the Selected Reserve makes substantial contributions to its parent Service. In the tables that follow, only those missions found in the Selected Reserve are presented for each Service. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are combined to display the impact on the Total Army.

Similarly, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve are combined to show their impact on the Total Air Force. The remaining Selected Reserve Components individually show their contribution to their parent Service.

TABLE 15  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVES  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY

Unit Types	AFNG % of Total Army	USAR % of Total Army	Combined % of Total Army
TOW Light Anti-Tank Infantry Battalions	100	—	100
Infantry Scout Troops	100	—	100
Heavy Helicopter Company	100	—	100
Training Divisions	—	100	100
Training Brigades	—	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Railroad Units	—	100	100
Civil Affairs Units	—	97	97
Public Affairs Units	65	30	95
Pathfinder Units	46	46	92
Psychological Operations Units	—	87	87
Chemical Units—Smoke Generator	—	85	85
Infantry Battalions	73	8	81
Corps Support Groups HHC	17	62	79
Separate Brigades	65	12	77
Maintenance Companies	46	28	74
Army Hospitals (Modified Table of Organization Equipment)	11	63	74
Supply and Service Units	31	40	71
Combat Engineer Battalions/Units	43	25	68
Truck Companies	37	30	67
Engineer Bridge Companies (Non-Div)	48	19	67
Military Police Companies (Non-Div)	43	24	67
Medical Units (Other)	24	40	64
Conventional Ammunition Companies	17	44	61
Corps Signal Battalions	47	10	57
Watercraft Companies	7	50	57
Armored Cavalry Regiments	57	—	57
Field Artillery Battalions	49	8	57
Special Forces Groups	25	25	50
Special Forces Battalions	25	25	50
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	47	2	49
Major Logistic Units TAACOM and COSCOM			
HHC/MMC Commands	22	26	48
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
QM Petroleum, Oil & Lubricant Companies	—	45	45
Combat Divisions	36	—	36
Medium Helicopter Companies	11	11	22

Note: <sup>1</sup>Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.  
Data as of September 30, 1985.

**TABLE 16**  
**NAVAL RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL NAVY**

<b>Unit Types</b>	<b>% of Total Navy<sup>1</sup></b>
CONUS Based Logistic Airlift Squadrons (VR)	100
CONUS Based Composite (Service) Squadrons (VC)	100
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HAL)	100
Combat SAR Capability (HC-9)	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Control of Shipping Organization	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	92
Ocean Minesweepers	86
Military Sealift Command (MSC) Military Personnel	85
Special Boat Forces	66
Mobile Construction Battalions	65
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons (VP)	35
Intelligence Personnel	34
Base Operating Support Personnel	17
Tactical Carrier Air Wings (CVW)	14
Early Warning A/C (VAW)	12
Surface Combatants (Frigates/Destroyers)	6
Amphibious Warfare Ships	3

Note: <sup>1</sup>Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.  
Data as of September 30, 1985.

**TABLE 17**  
**MARINE CORPS RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE**  
**TOTAL MARINE CORPS**

<b>Unit Types</b>	<b>% of Total Marine Corps<sup>1</sup></b>
Civil Affairs Group	100
Salvage Platoon	100
Force Reconnaissance Units	67
Force Service Military Support Group Police	40
Marine Tank Battalions	40
Beach and Port Company	40
Division Recon Company	35
Marine Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalions	33
Self Propelled 8" Artillery Batteries	33
Self Propelled 155mm Artillery Batteries	33
Marine Observation Aircraft Units	33
Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company	33
Marine Light Attack Aircraft Squadrons	30
Marine Light Utility Helicopters	26
Bulk Fuel Units	25
Marine Force Service Support Group	25
Forward Area Air Defense Battery	25
Marine Aerial Refuelers	23

Note: <sup>1</sup> Percentages are determined by counting like-type units.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

**TABLE 18**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS**  
**TO THE TOTAL AIR FORCE**

<b>Flying Units</b>	<b>ANG % of Total Air Force</b>	<b>USAFR % of Total Air Force</b>	<b>Combined % of Total Air Force</b>
<b>Aircraft<sup>1</sup></b>			
Aerial Spraying Capability	—	100	100
CONUS Strategic Interceptor Forces	78	—	78
Tactical Airlift	32	26	58
Tactical Reconnaissance	49	—	49
Air Rescue/Recovery	14	23	37
Tactical Fighters	26	8	34
Special Operations	—	34	34
Weather Reconnaissance	—	28	28
Tactical Air Support	24	—	24
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	17	4	21
Support Aircraft	21	—	21
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	2	7	9
<b>Aircrews<sup>2</sup></b>			
Strategic Airlift (Assoc)	—	50	50
Tanker/Cargo (Assoc)	—	50	50
Aeromedical Airlift (Assoc)	—	30	30
<b>Non-Flying Units<sup>3</sup></b>			
Aircraft Control and Warning Units	72	—	72
Combat Communications Units	66	—	66
Aerial Port Units	13	47	60
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	—	60	60
Engineering Installations Units	55	—	55
Tactical Control Units	55	—	55
Strategic Airlift Maintenance Personnel	—	40	40
Civil Engineering RED HORSE	17	17	34
Civil Engineering PRIME BEEF	25	9	34
Aero Medical Evacuation Crews	—	30	30
Medical Service Personnel	—	22	22
Weather Units	11	4	15

Notes: <sup>1</sup>Percentages determined by counting primary assigned aircraft.

<sup>2</sup>Percentages determined by counting aircrews assigned.

<sup>3</sup>Percentages determined by counting like-type units.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

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**TABLE 19**  
**COAST GUARD RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE**  
**TOTAL COAST GUARD**

<b>Major Augmented Active Duty Commands</b>	<b>% of Total Coast Guard<sup>1</sup></b>
Marine Safety Office Units (3,300 personnel)	65
Operation Shore Facilities (5,600 personnel)	38
Command & Control (1,080 personnel)	24
Repair/Supply/Research (538 personnel)	18
Training Commands (323 personnel)	12
Vessels (1,075 personnel)	10
Air stations (60 personnel)	2
Various Joint Commands (524 personnel) <sup>2</sup>	N/A

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Percentages determined by counting individuals.

<sup>2</sup> These 524 personnel will be deployed to serve with non-Coast Guard units.

Data as of September 30, 1985.

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## Appendix C

# Training Highlights

### GENERAL

The move from the usual two-week annual training period at the local military post to mission oriented training at mobilization stations and operational areas is no longer an exception to policy. To better define the increased training activities offered during FY 1985, some of the significant Reserve Component training activities are highlighted in this appendix.

### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

**USSOUTHCOM Exercises.** Army National Guard participation in USSOUTHCOM exercises started in 1983 with AHAUS TARA I. Since then, Guard participation has steadily increased. Exercise participation during FY 1985 included engineer, medical, combat arms, logistical, and transportation. The following highlights two of these exercises:

**BLAZING TRAILS.** This was a combined engineer exercise involving units of the Active Component, Army National Guard, and the Panamanian Defense Forces. The exercise objective was to repair and construct a 26 mile road in the western coast of the Azuero Peninsula — 150 miles from the Panama Canal. The exercise began in early January 1985 and concluded in mid-May. Approximately 10,000 Guardsmen from ten states participated in this year's exercise. Participating units conducted volunteer, off-duty community relations activities such as improving school buildings, distributing clothes donated by local communities in the U.S. and sponsoring Easter egg hunts. Medical assistance to residents of the area was provided by exercise medical personnel incidental to the military mission. The local residents are very vocal in their support of U.S. activity in the area.

**AHAUS TARA III.** A Texas Army National Guard Armor Task force conducted training in the Choluteca Province of Honduras, March 31 to April 18, 1985. The unit trained with the Honduran Army in an anti-armor exercise three miles from the Nicaraguan border. The tactical operation was very successful and provided needed training to Honduran forces as well as the Guard members. In addition to the tactical exercise, the Guard unit conducted civic actions in the local communities such as distributing donated foods, evaluating water sources, treating farm animals, providing medical care to residents and hosting a "Texas Barbeque". The Honduran people were very receptive and supportive of the exercise.

**WOUNDED WARRIOR 85.** The California Army National Guard sponsored this major medical exercise which involved both Active and Reserve

Components from several Services. The exercise was geographically dispersed over three posts in Central California: Camp Roberts, Camp San Luis Obispo, and Hunter Liggett Military Reservation. As the largest medical exercise since World War II, several hundred simulated casualties were processed in a combat scenario.

**BRIGHT STAR 85.** This was an extensive exercise involving all of the Services, with deployments to several nations in the Middle East. This exercise has grown to involve literally thousands of Reserve Component personnel each odd-numbered year.

### ARMY RESERVE

AR 350-9, Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training with Active Component Commands incorporates the latest wartime planning and CAPSTONE unit alignments. Procedures have been established for three and five year overseas training programs. Priority for overseas training is based on a unit's presence on a force list supporting a contingency plan, its CAPSTONE alignment, its respective latest arrival date (LAD) in a current approved plan, and its readiness posture. Some units may be represented by command and control cells depending on their mission and CAPSTONE alignment.

Army Reserve overseas deployment training participation has increased from 12 units/cells in FY 1976 to 1,035 units/cells containing 10,840 personnel in FY 1985. Over 829 units/cells containing 12,595 personnel are projected to participate during FY 1986. By using the Intensified Management Force List (IMFL) and CAPSTONE alignments, a more equitable selection process has been achieved. Increased Reserve Component CAPSTONE alignments also allow greater participation in joint exercises such as REFORGER, WINTEX, TEAM SPIRIT, and BRIGHT STAR. Overseas training is an excellent training vehicle for Army Reserve units and its expansion is fully supported. The training received is worthwhile and in keeping with wartime missions and planning.

Although the 1983 U.S. military involvement in Grenada began with the rescue of American students there, it continued throughout FY 1985 with the Army Reserve's assistance in a schools' revitalization program for Grenadan school children. Shortly after fighting ended on the island, Civil Affairs specialists from the USAR were sent to Grenada to work with the new government on rebuilding and refining essential services such as utilities, road networks, sewage, water, tourism, and education. The real-world mission included helping to reestablish the education system and supervising the rehabilitation of 20 dilapidated

schools with U.S. and Grenadan government help. By participating in such Civil Affairs programs and in medical or engineering programs in other countries, the Army Reserve has contributed to diplomatic efforts of our country while advancing its own training.

## NAVAL RESERVE

In addition to participation in numerous fleet exercises, the Naval Reserve obtained training while providing mutual support to the Active Component. Increased support of the Navy's peacetime mission by Naval Reservists was the most important by-product of training in real-world environments.

An example of the mutual support provided by Naval Reserve personnel in 1985 included the Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion that provided in excess of 1,300 man days to back load the S.S. Letitia Lykes prior to her return to station as a Maritime Preposition Ship. In addition, Naval Reserve construction forces delivered some 3,500 man days working on Panama Defense Force and Panamanian civil construction projects.

School capacities were increased some 29% by opening active duty training facilities on weekends with qualified Selected Reserve instructors. This activity has improved readiness through completion of required fleet school courses.

Naval Reserve units provided extensive support to Navy missions world-wide. Reserve Intelligence Units provided approximately 61,000 man days in production projects which directly supported the active forces. Additionally, non-flying air units and staffs provided support in excess of 42,000 man days. Naval Air Reserve units provided:

- 30,000 hours to adversary and target towing
- 2,000 hours to drug interdiction
- 400 hours to ship surveillance
- 114 hours to Honduras Commando Training in El Salvador
- All Fleet Airwing Search & Rescue Training
- All Airlifts of personnel and materials

## MARINE CORPS RESERVE

**RESPHIBLEX 85.** Reserve amphibious exercises were held on both the East and West coasts during summer 1985. Both operations were Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) size involving a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a composite squadron, and a combat service support element. Royal Marine Reservists participated in the ground combat element of the East Coast operation.

**COBRA GOLD.** 3rd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) provided control of close air support and indirect fire weapons in support of U.S. Forces during exercises with the Royal Thai Army in Thailand.

**BLAZING SKIES.** Marine Air Control Squadron 23 provided air control and data link interface between Air Force AWACS and an Army Air Defense

Brigade at White Sands Missile Range. In addition, the squadron provided ground control intercept control for U.S. Air Force fighters in a European corridor defense scenario.

**TEAM SPIRIT.** Approximately 120 Selected Marine Reservists and IRRs augmented III MAF in support of this major joint/combined exercise involving land, air and sea operations in Korea.

**WINTEX-CIMEX.** 17 IRRs augmented a NATO staff in London during this worldwide command post exercise.

**NEZ ROUGE.** Two helicopter squadrons exercised with Canadian Forces in a combined arms exercise conducted under cold weather conditions.

**BRIM FROST.** Detachments from 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines; 3rd ANGLICO, and 4th Forward Area Air Defense Battery were part of a field exercise conducted in Alaska for Combined/Joint Service Arctic training under the direction of Readiness Command.

**COLD LAKE.** In conjunction with a Canadian fighter/attack squadron, VMFA-321 performed annual training duty at Cold Lake, Canada. Training objectives included bombing in a high threat environment.

**Royal Marine Reserve Exchange.** Marine Reservists from 1st Battalion, 25th Marines participated in field exercises and a Home Defense Exercise in Scotland with 3 Commando Brigade, British Royal Marines.

**Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) 7-85 and 8-85.** Reserve MAUs participated in each live fire combined arms exercise held at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA. The successful integration of all supporting arms in a mechanized scheme of maneuver was a key objective.

**Reserve Counterpart Training.** Approximately 1,200 IRRs received MOS training from active duty counterparts at Marine Corps bases and facilities as part of a continuing USMCR commitment to increase the IRR mobilization potential.

## AIR NATIONAL GUARD

**RED FLAG.** This program at Nellis AFB provides excellent combat training in a realistic threat environment. In the Air National Guard alone, 18 Fighter/Reconnaissance/Interceptor units participated in RED FLAG exercises of two weeks each.

**CHECKERED FLAG TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS.** In FY 1985 ten Air National Guard Fighter and Reconnaissance units participated in seven deployments. Each unit is scheduled to deploy up to 12 aircraft and 275 personnel every three years.

**MAPLE FLAG.** This program is hosted by the Canadians at Cold Lake, Canada. The program is similar to RED FLAG but is conducted on a smaller scale in a European-type environment. Six Air National Guard fighter/reconnaissance units participated in MAPLE FLAG in FY 1985.

## AIR FORCE RESERVE

**BRIM FROST 85.** Three Tactical Airlift Groups in New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois deployed to Alaska with six C-130s and 151 support personnel for two weeks in January and February. Missions were flown under arctic conditions and included personnel and equipment airdrops and cargo delivery assignments to support U.S. and Canadian ground forces.

**TEAM SPIRIT 85.** Reservists numbering over 350 personnel from four Aerial Port Squadrons deployed at various Pacific Air Force bases during February and March to support cargo requirements for this exercise. A Tactical Fighter Group also deployed 15 F-4s and 276 support personnel to Kunson AB, Korea under the deployment named "CORONET FURY".

**SOLID SHIELD 85.** Four Air Force Reserve units participated in the U.S. Atlantic Command exercise in the Caribbean during April and May. Over 300 personnel, 20 F-4s, and two AC-130s deployed during this exercise.

**DISTANT HAMMER 85.** More than 500 Reserve Component personnel were deployed during May and June to participate in this exercise. Some of the activities were observed by members of the Board during the Board's two-week field trip in May. Two Tactical Fighter units supported exercise requirements by furnishing 18 F-4s under deployment "CORONET VENOM". Eight C-130s from a Tactical Airlift unit also participated.

**DISPLAY DETERMINATION 85.** One Tactical Fighter Wing deployed with 12 A-10s, and 250 support personnel during September to participate in this exercise. One hundred ninety two sorties and 222 flying hours were flown at their deployment location in Italy. In addition a Tactical Airlift Group deployed to Germany with 150 support personnel and 8 C-130s.

**OKSBOEL 85.** A Tactical Fighter Wing with 200 personnel and 12 F-16s deployed on "CORONET THUD" to Denmark in August and September. This was the first overseas deployment of Air Force Reserve F-16s.

**CORONET BOAR.** A rotational test of six A-10s to Sembach Air Base, Germany, was conducted in August. 125 personnel deployed from four Tactical Fighter units. The participation lasted 25 days and was very successful.

**AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION.** Aeromedical evacuation is an excellent example of the Air Force Reserve's Associate Program, and contribution to real world missions. The Air Force Reserve supports the active force by providing 64% of the aeromedical evacuation, using the C-9A Nightingale, C-130 Hercules and C-141 Starlifter aircraft.

## COAST GUARD RESERVE

**SHUTTLE SUPPORT.** Coast Guard Reservists provided waterside security and liaison functions with NASA for each space shuttle launch.

**FLEET EXERCISES 85.** The Coast Guard's increased emphasis on its wartime mission performance was highlighted by its participation in five JCS Command Post Exercises and seven Field Exercises. Major Field Exercises included: OCEAN SAFARI, SOLID SHIELD, REFORGER, BRIGHT STAR, BRIM FROST, and NORTHERN VIKING. The evaluation of harbor/coastal defenses, familiarization with Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Units, shipboard training, and testing of the Reserve Component mobilization processing system were objectives accomplished during these exercises. The coordination between Coast Guard and Naval Forces greatly enhanced the development of the Maritime Defense Zone concept.



## Appendix D

# Board Activities for Fiscal Year 1985

### GENERAL

In 1985 the Board commemorated thirty-three years of dedicated service to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the Nation. Tracing its origin back to President Truman's Executive Order 10007 of October 15, 1947, the Board has been variously designated The Committee on Civilian Components in 1947, the Civilian Components Policy Board in 1949, and finally, The Reserve Forces Policy Board when established by statute in 1952.

The entire Board meets in formal session for three or more days each calendar quarter as determined by the business at hand or by the scope of field trips to view training or exercises. Frequently, standing and special committees of the Board meet as required to receive briefings germane to their specific areas of interest, to observe exercises, to conduct studies, or to gain insight into policies developing in the Department of Defense that will impact on the Reserve Components. Thus the Board, as the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve Components, conducts its business independently of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services but with due regard for their statutory responsibilities. Additionally, the Board meets with Defense policy makers, Congressional leaders, leaders from executive departments and agencies, and leaders from the private sector.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is unique in its advisory role. The Board melds the expertise of the non-active duty members of the Reserve Components with that of civilian appointees and uniformed representatives of the Active Components. Board membership represents, in addition to nationwide geographic dispersion, a broad variety of civilian and military background and experience. This Board is the means by which the Secretary of Defense brings into consultation the entire range of National Guard and Reserve expertise. The Board, although declared independent by statute, functions as part of the Secretary of Defense in-house team, bringing field perspectives to advise on a broad variety of policy issues affecting the Reserve Components.

### COMMITTEES

During FY 1985, the Board utilized the following committees to study and formulate recommendations on issues relating to the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force:

### Standing Committees

- Personnel and Manpower
- Mobilization and Deployment

### Special Committees

- ROPMA
- Force Mix

### MEETINGS WITH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS

The Chairman and the Board met frequently this year with key leadership, both civilian and military, foreign and domestic. These persons included:

- Major General Sabahattin Akinci  
Commander, Turkish Armor School and Training Center
- Lieutenant General John B. Blount, USA  
Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Southern Europe  
Naples, Italy
- Commodore Harold J. Bernsen, USN  
Director, Plans, Programs & Policy, J-5  
US Central Command (CENTCOM)
- Lieutenant General Nezihi Cakar  
Turkish General Staff  
Ankara, Turkey
- Honorable Chapman Cox  
General Counsel  
Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Major General Harold M. Davis, Jr., USA  
Commanding General  
Southern European Task Force and 5th Support  
Command  
Vicenza, Italy
- General Giorgio Donati (Italy)  
Commanding General, Allied Land Forces  
Southern Europe  
Verona, Italy
- Brigadier General Uluer Ecerel  
Military Attache, Turkey  
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
- Mr. Dick Ellis  
Executive Director  
National Committee for Employer Support of  
the Guard and Reserve
- Major General Jack B. Farris, Jr., USA  
Deputy Commanding General  
XVIII Airborne Corps
- Ambassador Charles A. Gillespie  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-  
American Affairs

- Admiral James S. Gracey, USCG  
Commandant  
US Coast Guard
- Mr. Charles W. Groover  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Program Integration)  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(FM&P)
- Commodore John J. Higginson, USN  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics  
Allied Forces Southern Europe  
Naples, Italy
- Lieutenant General Roberto Iucci  
Vice Chief of Staff  
Italian Defense Staff
- General Paul X. Kelley, USMC  
Commandant  
US Marine Corps
- Mr. Donald A. Kruse  
Special Assistant for International Affairs  
Allied Forces Southern Europe  
Naples, Italy
- Brigadier General Dimitrios Kyriazopoulos  
Defense Attache, Greece  
Embassy of Greece
- Honorable John Lehman  
Secretary of the Navy
- Major General Donald P. Litke, USAF  
Commander, Turkey-US Logistics Group  
(TUSLOG)  
Ankara, Turkey
- Brigadier General Zeve Livne  
Hof Ashqelon Site  
Israeli Defense Forces
- Major General Ludovico Lombardi (Italy)  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Southern  
Europe  
Verona, Italy
- Major General George E. Marine, USA  
Chief of Staff, Allied Land Forces,  
Southeastern Europe  
Izmir, Turkey
- Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Secretary of the Army
- Admiral Wesley McDonald, USN  
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic,  
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command  
Norfolk, Virginia
- Mr. Ted Morse  
US Agency for International Development
- Honorable Verne Orr  
Secretary of the Air Force
- General N. Ozturun  
Vice Chief of Staff, Turkish General Staff  
Ankara, Turkey
- Lieutenant General Gioacchino Papacchini (Italy)  
Commander, Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force  
Verona, Italy
- Major General Elmer D. Pendleton, Jr., USA  
Chief, Joint US Military Mission for Aid to  
Turkey (JUSMMAT)  
Ankara, Turkey
- His Excellency, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin  
Minister of Defense, Israel
- Dr. Luigi Sartori, President CIOR  
Presidio Militare  
Venice, Italy
- Major General Amon Shahak  
Commander, Central Command  
Israeli Defense Forces
- Mr. Dennis R. Shaw  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Reserve Affairs)
- Major General Stuart H. Sherman, Jr., USAF  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Guard/  
Reserve Manpower and Personnel)  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Reserve Affairs)
- Admiral William N. Small, USN  
Commander-in-Chief  
Allied Forces Southern Europe  
Naples, Italy
- Rear Admiral Robert H. Spiro, Jr. USNR-(Ret)  
Executive Director  
Reserve Officers Association
- Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe  
U.S. Ambassador, Turkey  
Ankara, Turkey
- General Richard H. Thompson, USA  
Commanding General  
Army Materiel Command
- General Maxwell R. Thurman, USA  
Vice Chief of Staff  
US Army
- General Ragip Ulugbay (Turkey)  
Commander, Allied Land Forces  
Southeastern Europe  
Izmir, Turkey
- General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Lieutenant General Emmett H. Walker, Jr.,  
USA  
Chief, National Guard Bureau
- Honorable James H. Webb, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
- Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense
- Senator Pete Wilson  
Chairman, Personnel and Manpower  
Subcommittee  
Senate Armed Services Committee
- Mr. G. Kim Wincup  
Staff Director, Armed Services Committee  
House of Representatives
- Major General Fred F. Woerner, USA  
Commanding General  
193rd Infantry Brigade, Republic of Panama
- Major General Amos Yaron  
Chief, A Branch  
Israeli Defense Forces
- Commodore Richard E. Young, USN  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness and  
Tactics  
CINCLANT Fleet Staff

## FIELD TRIPS

In the last two years, overseas trips were made to NATO and other countries to study deployment plans for U.S. Armed Forces, review exercise lessons learned, and observe U.S. Reservists in training. Insights gained will aid the Board in developing policy recommendations that will further improve the readiness, deployability, and sustainability of our Reserve Components. In addition, the Board studied foreign reserve policies and procedures for applicability to our Reserve Components. Visits to military headquarters in FY 1985 included:

- General Headquarters, Central Command  
Jerusalem, Israel
- General Headquarters, Israeli Defense Forces  
Tel Aviv, Israel
- Reserve Division Mobilization Center  
Tel-Hashomer, Israel
- Reserve Emergency Stores Unit  
Israel
- Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe  
Naples, Italy
- Headquarters, Allied Naval Forces Southern  
Europe  
Naples, Italy

- Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Southern  
Europe  
Naples, Italy
- Headquarters, Allied Land Forces Southern  
Europe  
Verona, Italy
- Headquarters, Southern Europe Task Force  
Vicenza, Italy
- Headquarters, Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force  
Vicenza, Italy
- Headquarters, Turkish General Staff  
Ankara, Turkey
- Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey  
Ankara, Turkey
- US Air Force Turkey-US Logistic Group  
Ankara, Turkey
- Headquarters, Allied Land Forces Southeastern  
Europe  
Izmir, Turkey
- Headquarters, Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force  
Izmir, Turkey

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“The Reservist is a Regular Soldier on 11 month's leave.”

*Yitzhak Rabin*

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
“...we might see, with admiration, the Freedom and Independence of Switzerland supported for Centuries, in the midst of powerful and jealous neighbours, by means of a hardy and well organized Militia.”

*George Washington*


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## Appendix E


# Members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

  
HONORABLE WILL HILL TANKERSLEY  
Chairman


### Department of the Army


  
HONORABLE DELBERT L. SPURLOCK  
Assistant Secretary of the Army  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

  
CARL E. VUONO  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA


  
WILLIAM H. DUNCAN  
MAJOR GENERAL, ARNGUS


  
CHARLES M. KIEFFER  
MAJOR GENERAL, ARNGUS


  
HENRY W. MEETZE  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAR


  
DANIEL C. HELIX  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAR


### Department of the Navy


  
HONORABLE CHARLES G. UNTERMAYER  
Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

  
CECIL J. KEMPF  
VICE ADMIRAL, USN

  
DONALD T. CORRIGAN  
REAR ADMIRAL, USNR

  
LEMUEL O. WAREFIELD  
REAR ADMIRAL, USNR

  
JOHN J. SALESES  
MAJOR GENERAL, USMCR

  
CHARLES S. BISHOP  
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USMCR


## Department of the Air Force



HONORABLE TIDAL W. MCCOY  
Assistant Secretary of the Air  
Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs  
and Installations)




WILLIAM J. MALL, JR.  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF



JOHN L. FRANCE  
MAJOR GENERAL, ANGUS



DARROL G. SCHROEDER  
MAJOR GENERAL, ANGUS



JAMES W. TAYLOR  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAFR



DONALD A. MCGANN  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAFR

## United States Coast Guard




ALAN D. BREED  
REAR ADMIRAL, USCG



JAMES H. P. COMB, III  
REAR ADMIRAL, USCGR

## Military Executive



JAMES D. DELK  
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1985, is a reflection of the consensus of the 22 member board. Although most recommendations and policy changes had unanimous support, neither this report nor the signature of the Members purport to indicate that the Military Departments, Services or signers concur with each and every recommended action.

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